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Abstract 
Critical infrastructures (CIs) are of essential importance for modern society: these systems 
provide the essential functions of public safety and enable, through their services, the 
higher-level functions of a community, such as housing, education, healthcare and the 
economy. A harmonized approach for stress testing critical non-nuclear infrastructures, 
ST@STREST, has been developed. The aims of the ST@STREST methodology and 
framework are to quantify the safety and the risk of individual components as well as of 
whole CI system with respect to extreme events, and to compare the expected behavior 
of the CI to acceptable values.  
This report summarizes the ST@STREST methodology and framework, and addresses the 
extensions of the proposed methodology towards life-cycle management of civil 
infrastructures and evaluation of civil infrastructure system post-disaster resilience. A 
detailed elaboration of these topics is presented in the accompanying Work Package 5 
reports. The ST@STREST methodology has been applied to six key representative Critical 
Infrastructures (CIs) in Europe, exposed to variant hazards, namely: a petrochemical plant 
in Milazzo, Italy, large dams of the Valais region in Switzerland, hydrocarbon pipelines in 
Turkey, the Gasunie national gas storage and distribution network in the Netherlands, the 
port infrastructure of Thessaloniki, Greece and an industrial district in the region of 
Tuscany, Italy. The outcomes of these stress tests are presented in the STREST Reference 
Report 5. 
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1. Introduction 
Critical infrastructures (CIs) are of essential importance for modern society: these systems 
provide the essential functions of public safety and enable, through their services, the 
higher-level functions of a community, such as housing, education, healthcare and the 
economy. Extreme natural events can interrupt services, cause damage, or even destroy 
such CI systems, which consequently trigger disruption of vital socio-economic activities, 
extensive property damage, and/or human injuries or loss of lives. Recent catastrophic 
events showed that the CI systems rarely recover their functionality back to the pre-
disaster state, significantly increasing the concerns of the public.  
In the context of the STREST project, a harmonized approach for stress testing critical 
non-nuclear infrastructures, ST@STREST, has been developed. The aims of the 
ST@STREST methodology and framework are to quantify the safety and the risk of 
individual components as well as of whole CI system with respect to extreme events and 
to compare the expected behavior of the CI to acceptable values. In particular, a multi-
level stress test methodology has been proposed. Each level is characterized by a different 
scope (component or system) and by a different level of risk analysis complexity (starting 
from design codes and ending with state-of-the-art probabilistic risk analyses, such as 
cascade modelling). This allows flexibility and application to a broad range of 
infrastructures. The framework is composed of four main phases and nine steps. First the 
goals, the method, the time frame, and the total costs of the stress test are defined. Then, 
the stress test is performed at component and system level; additionally, the outcomes 
are checked and analyzed. Finally, the results are reported and communicated to 
stakeholders and authorities. The ST@STREST data framework, used to store and manage 
the data about the CI under test, is also flexible, in that it allows the use of data structures 
that support frequentist (event and fault trees, bow ties) and belief-based notions of 
probability.  
The stress test approach proposed in this project addresses the vulnerabilities of CIs to 
catastrophic but rare (high-consequence low-probability) natural hazard events. An 
extension of the proposed ST@STREST methodology and framework to integrate the 
results of stress tests and the data retrieved after disastrous events with the data collected 
during every-day operation of the system and its degradation (low-consequence persistent 
events) into a unified life-cycle management strategy for CIs has been proposed. In 
particular, the results of the risk analysis conducted in the scope of a stress test in terms 
of system performance and expected costs of natural events, may be incorporated in a 
life-cycle cost analysis of the CI system and optimization of its operations and 
maintenance. Further, the evaluation of risk reduction strategies resulting from a loss 
disaggregation may make it possible to improve the full management and maintenance 
plan of the CI itself. Moreover, the evaluation of the state of civil infrastructures after the 
occurrence of a natural event, and the collection and processing of post-event data, such 
as typology, location, component’s features and the assessed physical damages, can be 
useful to update the state condition history of the inspected components of the CI and to 
estimate and/or update performance prediction models used in a future risk analysis. 
The CIs support the vital functions of public safety, and provide energy, water, 
communication and transportation services. By doing so, the CIs are an essential layer of 
front-line systems that support the economic functions of a community, such as 
employment opportunities, adequate wages and affordable housing options, as well as 
social functions like community ownership and participation, education and training 
opportunities, and a sense of community and place. Therefore, the CIs play a crucial role 
in enabling a community to successfully function by providing the physical foundations for 
much of the economic and social activities that characterize a modern society.  
An extension of the ST@STREST methodology and framework to evaluate not only the 
vulnerability but also the resilience of CIs, i.e. “the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, 
recover from and more successfully adapt to adverse events” (TNA, The National Academy 
2012) has also been proposed. This extension builds on the ST@STREST methodology by 
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modelling the post-disaster recovery process of a CI system and by quantifying the lack 
of resilience and the attributes of a resilient system using a novel compositional 
supply/demand CI resilience quantification framework. This extension enables a new role 
of a stress test, that of examining the ability of a community and its CIs to bounce back 
after a natural disaster.  
This report is structured in the following way: 
o in Chapter 2, the main aspects of the proposed engineering risk-based methodology 
for stress tests of non-nuclear CIs, ST@STREST, are presented. First, the workflow 
and the interaction among the main actors of the process are discussed. Then the 
multi-level approach and the different levels of analysis are presented. Finally, a 
possible grading system for quantifying the outcomes of a CI stress test is 
introduced. This system enables uniform grading of stress test outcomes across a 
broad spectrum of CIs as well as indicating how much the risk of the CI should be 
reduced in the next periodical verification of the CI. 
o in Chapter 3 a method to integrate the results of stress tests and the data collected 
after disastrous events into a unified life-cycle management strategy for CIs is 
introduced. This method enables management of both long-term degradation and 
instantaneous natural hazard-induced stressors during the lifetime of a CI system. 
o in Chapter 4 the link between societal resilience and the CIs of the community 
affected by a disaster is established first. Then, a time-varying metrics of resilience 
of a system is adopted in order to represent the pre-event state of the community, 
the phases of disaster-induced loss accumulation and absorption, followed by the 
recovery phase and finishing with the post-event adapted state of the community. 
A novel compositional supply/demand resilience quantification framework is 
presented. 
The proposed ST@STREST methodology has been applied to six key representative Critical 
Infrastructures (CIs) in Europe, exposed to variant hazards, namely: a petrochemical plant 
in Milazzo, Italy, large dams of the Valais region in Switzerland, hydrocarbon pipelines in 
Turkey, the Gasunie national gas storage and distribution network in the Netherlands, the 
port infrastructure of Thessaloniki, Greece and an industrial district in the region of 
Tuscany, Italy. The outcomes of these stress tests are presented in the STREST ERR5 
(Pitilakis et al, 2016). 
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2. ST@STREST methodology for stress testing of critical 
non-nuclear infrastructures 
The aims of the proposed methodology are to assess the performance of individual 
components as well as of whole CI systems with respect to extreme events, and to 
compare this response to acceptable values (performance objectives) that are specified at 
the beginning of the stress test. ST@STREST is based on probabilistic and quantitative 
methods for best-possible characterization of extreme scenarios and consequences 
(Cornell and Krawinkler, 2000; Mignan et al, 2014; 2016a). 
Further, it is important to note that CIs cannot be tested using only one approach: they 
differ in the potential consequence of failure, the types of hazards, and the available 
resources for conducting the stress tests. Therefore, multiple stress test levels are 
proposed (Section 2.3). Each Stress Test Level (ST-L) is characterized by different focus 
(component or system) and by different levels of risk analysis complexity (starting from 
design codes and ending with state-of-the-art probabilistic risk analyses, such as cascade 
modelling, Mignan et al, 2016a). The selection of the appropriate Stress Test Level 
depends on regulatory requirements, based on the different importance of the CI, and the 
available human/financial resources to perform the stress test.   
In order to allow transparency of the ST@STREST process, a description of the 
assumptions made to identify the hazard and to model the risk (consequences) and the 
associated frequencies is required. The data, models and methods adopted for the risk 
assessment and the associated uncertainties are clearly documented and managed by 
different experts involved in the stress test process, following a pre-defined process for 
managing the multiple-expert integration (Selva et al, 2015, Selva et al, in prep.). This 
allows defining how reliable the results of the stress test are (i.e. level of “detail and 
sophistication”) of the stress test (Section 2.6).  
Different experts are involved in the implementation of stress test process and different 
roles and responsibilities are assigned to different actors, as described in Section 2.1 and 
Section 2.2. In particular, several participants may be involved, with different background 
knowledge. The size of such groups depends on selected ST-Level (see Section 2.3). 
The workflow of ST@STREST comprises four phases (Fig. 2.1): Pre-Assessment phase; 
Assessment phase; Decision phase; and Report phase. In the Pre-Assessment phase the 
data available on the CI (risk context) and on the phenomena of interest (hazard context) 
is collected. Then, the goal, the time frame, the total costs of the stress test, and the most 
appropriate Stress Test Level to apply to test the CI are defined. In the Assessment phase, 
the stress test is performed at Component and System Levels. In the Decision phase, the 
stress test outcomes are checked, i.e. the results of risk assessment are compared to the 
objectives defined in Pre-Assessment phase. Then critical events, i.e. events that most 
likely cause a given level of loss, are identified and risk mitigation strategies and guidelines 
are formulated based on the identified critical events and presented in the Report phase. 
All the aspects characterizing the ST@STREST methodology are described in the following 
sections, in particular: 
o The use of multiple experts (Section 2.1): to guarantee the robustness of stress 
test results, to manage subjective decisions and quantify epistemic uncertainty.  
o The workflow of the process (Section 2.2): description of the sequence of phases 
and steps which have to be carried out in a stress test. 
o The multi-level framework (Section 2.3): the different levels of the risk analysis to 
test the CI response to natural hazards. 
o Data structures (Section 2.4): different representations of complex systems for a 
probabilistic risk analysis. 
o The grading system (Section 2.5): to compare the results of the risk assessment 
with acceptance criteria and define the outcome of the test. 
ST@STREST methodology for stress testing of critical non-nuclear infrastructures 
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o The penalty system (Section 2.6): to acknowledge the limitation of the methods 
and models used to assess the performance of the CI and eventually penalize the 
output of the risk assessment. 
 
Fig. 2.1  Workflow of ST@STREST methodology 
2.1 ST@STREST multiple-expert integration: EU@STREST 
The involvement of multiple experts is critical in a risk assessment when potential 
controversies exist and the regulatory concerns are relatively high. In order to produce 
robust and stable results, the integration of experts plays indeed a fundamental role in 
managing subjective decisions and in quantifying the epistemic uncertainty capturing ‘the 
center, the body, and the range of technical interpretations that the larger technical 
community would have if they were to conduct the study’ (SSHAC, 1997). To this end, the 
experts’ diverse range of views and opinions, their active involvement, and their formal 
feedbacks need to be organized into a structured process ensuring transparency, 
accountability and independency.  
EU@STREST, a formalized multiple expert integration process has been developed within 
STREST (Selva et al 2015, Selva et al, in prep.) and integrated into the ST@STREST 
Workflow (Section 2.2). This process guarantees the robustness of stress test results, 
considering the differences among CIs with respect to their criticality, complexity and 
ability to conduct hazard and risk analyses, manages subjective decision making, and 
enables quantification of the epistemic uncertainty. With respect to the different levels in 
the SSHAC process developed for nuclear critical infrastructures (SSHAC, 1997), the 
proposed process is located between SSHAC levels 2 and 3 in terms of expert interaction. 
EU@STREST also makes an extensive use of classical Expert Elicitations, and is extended 
to single risk and multi-risk analyses. 
ST@STREST methodology for stress testing of critical non-nuclear infrastructures 
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The core actors in the multiple expert process are the Project Manager (PM), the Technical 
Integrator (TI), the Evaluation Team (ET), the Pool of Experts (PoE), and the Internal 
Reviewers (IR). The interactions among these actors are well-defined in the process. The 
descriptions and the roles of these actors are given below. 
o Project Manager (PM): Project manager is a stakeholder who owns the problem and 
is responsible and accountable for the successful development of the project. It is 
the responsibility of the PM that his/her decisions appear rational and fair to the 
authorities and public. The PM specifically defines all the questions that the ST 
should answer. 
o Technical Integrator (TI): The technical integrator is an analyst responsible and 
accountable for the scientific management of the project. The TI is responsible for 
capturing the views of the informed technical community in the form of trackable 
opinions and community distributions, to be implemented in the hazard and risk 
calculations. Thus, the TI explicitly manages the integration process. The TI should 
have: i) expertise on managing classical Expert Elicitation (cEE), preparing 
questionnaires and analyzing the results in order to manage the interviews to 
extract the information from the larger community feedbacks regarding critical 
choices/issues that any test involves (e.g., the selection of appropriate scientifically 
acceptable models); ii) experience in hazard and risk calculations; iii) experience in 
expert integration techniques, in order to manage the quantification and the 
propagation of epistemic uncertainty out of acceptable models. 
o Evaluation Team (ET): The Evaluation Team is a group of analysts that actually 
perform the hazard, vulnerability and risk assessments required by the ST, under 
the guidelines provided by the TI. The team is selected by consensus between the 
TI and PM, and it may be formed by internal CI resources and/or external experts. 
In this sense, the ET represents also the interface between the project and the CI 
authorities, guaranteeing the successful and reciprocal acknowledgement of choices 
and results. 
o Pool of Experts (PoE): This pool is formed only if required by the ST-Level. For most 
ST-Ls, the role of the PoE is covered by the TI. It has the goal of representing the 
larger technical community within the process. Two sub-pools are foreseen, which 
can partially overlap: PoE-H (a pool of hazard analysts) and PoE-V (a pool of 
vulnerability and risk analysts). The PoE-H should have either site-specific 
knowledge (e.g., hazards in the area) and/or expertise on a particular methodology 
and/or procedure useful to the TI and the ET team in developing the community 
distribution regarding hazard assessments. The PoE-V should have expertise on the 
specific CI and/or on the typology of CI and/or on a particular methodology and/or 
procedure useful to the TI and the ET team regarding fragility and vulnerability 
assessments. Individual experts of the pool may also act as proponent and advocate 
a particular hypothesis or technical position, in individual communications with the 
TI (referring to SSHAC (1997) documents, the PoE includes both resource and 
proponent experts). They participate to the interviewing processes (either in remote 
or through specific meetings) lead by the TI as pool of experts, providing the TI for 
their opinions on critical choices/issues. If requested by the CI authorities or if 
irreconcilable disagreements among the experts of the pool emerge during the 
interviewing processes (in both PHASE 1 and PHASE 2 of the Workflow, see Section 
2.2), the TI and PM may decide to organize meetings with the PoE (or parts of it), 
in order to openly discuss about controversial issues. In this case, the pool acts as 
a panel, and the TI is responsible for moderating the discussion.  
o Internal Reviewers (IR): One expert or a group of experts on subject matter under 
review that independently peer reviews and evaluates the work done by the TI and 
the ET. This group provides constructive comments and recommendations during 
the implementation of the project. In particular, IR reviews the coherence between 
TI choices and PM requests, the TI selection of the PoE in terms of expertise 
ST@STREST methodology for stress testing of critical non-nuclear infrastructures 
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coverage and scientific independence, the fairness of TI integration of PoE 
feedbacks, and the coherence between TI requests and ET implementations. In 
particular, IR reviews the project both in terms of technical and procedural aspects 
of the project (actor’s independency, transparency, consistency with the project 
plan). The IR makes sure that the TI has captured the center, body and range of 
technically defensible interpretations when epistemic uncertainty is accounted for 
in the ST level. Note that the IR actively plays an important role during the project 
and thus is part of the project. If regulators or external authorities foresee an 
external review of the project results, this further review is performed 
independently and after the end of the project. Here, the internal review by the IR 
is considered essential also in this case, in order to increase the likelihood of a 
successful external ex post review.   
The CI authorities select the PM. The PM selects the TI and IR and, jointly with the TI, the 
components of the ET and of the PoE. PM and TI are, in principle, individuals. The ET and 
IR may involve several participants, with different background knowledge, but in specific 
cases may be reduced to individuals. The PoE is, by definition, a group of experts. In all 
cases, the size of groups depends on the purpose and the given resources of the project. 
The PM interacts only with the TI and specifically defines all the questions that the project 
should answer to, taking care of the technical and societal aspects (e.g., selection of the 
ST level, definition of acceptable risks, etc.). The TI coordinates the scientific process 
leading to answer to these questions, coordinating the ET in the implementation of the 
analysis, organizing the interaction with the PoE (through elicitations and individual 
interactions), and integrating PoE and IR feedbacks into the analysis. The ET implements 
the analysis, following the TI choices. The IR reviews the whole process, in order to 
maximize the reliability of the results and to increase their robustness. The basic 
interactions among the core actors are shown in Fig. 2.2. 
 
Fig. 2.2  The basic interactions among the core actors in the process of EU@STREST 
2.2 ST@STREST workflow 
The workflow represents a systematic sequence of steps (processes) which have to be 
carried out in a stress test. As mentioned before, the ST@STREST workflow comprises four 
phases: Pre-Assessment phase; Assessment phase; Decision phase; and Report phase. 
Each phase is subdivided into a number of specific steps, with a total of 9 steps.  
In the Pre-Assessment phase all the data available on the CI and on the phenomena of 
interest (hazard context) are collected. Then, the goal (i.e. the risk measures and 
objectives), the time frame, the total costs of the stress test and the most appropriate 
Stress Test Level to apply are defined. In the Assessment phase, the stress test is 
performed at Component and System Levels. The performance of each component of the 
CI and of the whole system is checked according to the Stress Test Level selected in Phase 
ST@STREST methodology for stress testing of critical non-nuclear infrastructures 
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1. In the Decision Phase, the stress test outcomes are checked i.e. the results of risk
assessment are compared to the risk objectives defined in Phase 1. Then critical events, 
i.e. events that most likely cause a given level of loss value are identified through a 
disaggregation analysis. Finally, risk mitigation strategies and guidelines are formulated 
based on the identified critical events. In the Reporting Phase the results are presented to 
CI authorities and regulators. 
Fig. 2.3  Interaction among the main actors during the multiple-expert process 
EU@STREST. The PoE is present only in ST sub-levels c and d. For sub-levels a and b, 
the role of the PoE is assumed directly by the TI 
The participation of the different actors significantly changes along the different phases of 
the Stress Test (Fig. 2.3). The PM and TI are the most active participants in the ST 
workflow. The PM participates in all the steps of the Stress Test until the end (reporting of 
the results), while the role of TI ends at the end of the Decision phase. The TI is constantly 
assisted by the ET and supported by the PM, while the level of assistance depends on the 
ST level. The PoE (if present, see Section 2.3) participates in the Assessment and Decision 
phases. The IR performs a participatory review at the end of Phase 1 and 3. The final 
agreement, at the end of the Decision phase, is made among the PM, TI and IR. 
The workflow and the involvement of main actors and their phase-wise interactions are 
shown in Fig. 2.3. In the following, a detailed description of the four phases is provided 
together with a specification of the involvement of the different experts in process. 
2.2.1 PHASE 1: Pre-Assessment phase 
The Pre-Assessment phase comprises the following three steps: 
o STEP 1 Data collection: collection of all the data available on the CI (risk context)
and on the phenomena of interest (hazard context). Also data coming from Stress
Tests performed on other similar CI and/or in the same area are collected. In this
step, the test participants are selected: the PM selects the TI and the IR; the TI and
the PM jointly select the ET. Then, the TI, with the technical assistance of the ET,
ST@STREST methodology for stress testing of critical non-nuclear infrastructures 
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collects data and relevant information about hazards and CI, and about previous 
Stress Tests. The TI pre-selects the potential target hazards and the relevant CI 
components. 
o STEP 2 Risk Measures and Objectives: definition of one or more risk measures (e.g. 
fatalities, economic loss, etc.) and objectives (e.g. expected loss, annual probability 
etc.). This definition is performed by the PM, based on the regulatory requirements, 
the technical and societal considerations, and previous Stress Tests. 
o STEP 3 Set-up of the Stress Test: selection of the Stress Test Level, and Timing and 
Costs of the project and definition of the “level of detail and sophistication” used for 
the computation of the assessment phase, as presented in Section 2.6. The 
selection of the ST-Level is made by the PM with the assistance of the TI, based on 
the regulatory requirements.  
STEP 3 may be a long process and may differ substantially depending if the PoE is in place 
or not, according to the ST-L selected. The presence of the PoE allows for a robust set-up 
of the ST, based on the quantitative feedbacks of multiple experts. In this case, the PM 
and TI set an initial costs and timeframe for the assessments to be performed in STEP 3. 
The TI selects the PoE and organizes a one-day kick-off meeting with PoE, ET, and PM. 
With the assistance of PoE, through classical Expert Elicitation, the TI selects the target 
single and multiple hazards and the relevant CI components and their interactions. If 
significant disagreements emerge from the elicitation result, the TI may promote specific 
topical discussions among the members of the PoE, enabling a final decision. Based on 
this selection, the TI and PM integrate the ET and the PoE to have a complete coverage of 
the required expertise. The TI collects applicable scientific models and data needed for 
hazard, vulnerability and risk assessment, with the technical assistance of the ET (and 
through potential individual interaction with the PoE, if required). At this stage, also 
potential lacks in modelling procedures are identified by the TI. If technically possible, 
such lacks should be filled by the TI based on quantification through classical Expert 
Elicitation of the PoE, which is at this point planned for PHASE 2. Otherwise, a 
complementary scenario-based assessment should be planned (see Section 2.3). The 
specification of this scenario-based assessment (e.g., the definition of scenarios to be 
considered) is made through a specific classical Expert Elicitation planned for PHASE 2.  
To complete the planning of actions in PHASE 2, the TI also plans the classical Expert 
Elicitation of the PoE for ranking alternative models to be used in the stress test, in order 
to enable the quantification of epistemic uncertainty.  
If the selected ST-Level does not foresee the presence of the PoE, this process becomes 
simplified since all critical decisions are taken directly by one single expert, the TI. The TI 
selects the target hazards and the relevant CI components. Based on this selection, the 
TI and PM integrate the ET, to have a complete coverage of the required expertise.  
In either case, at the end of these basic choices, the TI collects applicable scientific models 
and data needed for hazard, vulnerability and risk assessment, with the technical 
assistance of the ET. Based on this collection, the TI and PM jointly identify the “level of 
detail and sophistication” used for the computation of the assessment phase (see Section 
2.6) based on target costs and model availability. As mentioned above, one of the main 
goal of this assessment phase is to capture the center and range of technical 
interpretations that the larger technical community would have if they were to conduct the 
study. A preliminary sensitivity analysis may help to identify the key parameters which 
controls the results in order to focus the uncertainty analysis and experts discussions on 
these key inputs. 
All decisions/definitions are specifically documented by the TI. The IR reviews such 
documents and provides his/her feedbacks regarding the decisions/definitions made thus 
far. The PM and TI finalize all documents, based on this review. At this point, the final 
costs and the exact timing for PHASE 2 and PHASE 3 are established. Further, based on 
the IR review, the PM and TI may evaluate potential changes to the analysis 
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implementation along the assessment phase, in order to avoid potential penalties 
suggested by the reviewers. In fact, in the case the “level of detail and sophistication” 
reached in the final implementation is lower than the level required, a Penalty System is 
applied to the output of the risk assessment (STEP 6 Risk objectives Check). 
2.2.2 PHASE 2: Assessment phase 
The Assessment phase is characterized by two steps in which the stress test is performed 
at Component and System levels according to the Stress Test Level selected in Phase 1. 
In particular: 
o STEP 4 Component Level Assessment: the performance of each component of the 
CI is checked by the hazard-based assessment, design-based assessment or risk-
based assessment approach (see Section 2.3). This check is performed by the TI or 
by one expert of the ET selected by the TI. 
o STEP 5 System Level Assessment: the stress test at the system level is performed. 
At first, the TI finalizes all the required models. In particular, if the PoE is in place 
(sub-levels c), the TI organizes the classical Expert Elicitations in order to: i) fill 
potential methodological gaps, ii) quantify the potential scenario for the scenario-
based risk assessment (SBRA), and iii) rank the alternative models to enable the 
quantification of the epistemic uncertainty. The PoE performs the elicitation 
remotely. Open discussions among the PoE members (moderated by the TI) are 
foreseen only if significant disagreements emerge in the elicitation results. If the 
PoE is not in place but EU assessment is required (sub-level b), the TI directly 
assigns scores on the selected models for ranking. Then, the ET (coordinated by 
the TI) actually implements all the required models and performs the assessment. 
If specific technical problems emerge during the implementation and application, 
TI may solve them through individual interactions with members of the PoE (if 
foreseen at the ST-Level). 
2.2.3 PHASE 3: Decision phase 
The Decision Phase is characterized by three steps: 
o STEP 6 Risk objectives Check: comparison of results of the Assessment phase to 
the risk objectives. This task is performed by the TI, with the technical assistance 
of the ET. Depending on the type of risk measures and objectives defined by the 
PM (F-N curve, expected value, etc.) and on the level of “detail and sophistication” 
adopted to capture the center and range of technical interpretations, the 
comparison between results from probabilistic risk assessment with these goals 
may differ (see Section 2.6). One possibility to assess the difference between the 
obtained risk measures and the adopted risk objectives is presented in Section 2.5 
where the outcome of the stress test is presented by grades (e.g. AA – negligible 
risk, A – as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) risk, B – possibly unjustifiable 
risk, C – intolerable risk).  
o STEP 7 Disaggregation/Sensitivity Analysis: identification of critical events. This 
task is performed by the ET coordinated by the TI. Critical events that most likely 
cause the exceedance of the considered loss value are identified through a 
disaggregation analysis1 (Esposito et al 2016) and based on them, risk mitigation 
strategies and guidelines are then formulated. If specific technical problems emerge 
during the application, the TI may solve them through individual interactions with 
the PoE (if present). This step is not mandatory. It depends on the results of STEP 
                                           
1 See Appendix B, Deliverable 5.1 (Esposito et al, 2016). 
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6 (Risk objectives Check). For example, if the outcome of STEP 6 is that the critical 
infrastructure passes the stress tests, performing STEP 7 may be informative, but 
is not required.  
o STEP 8 Guidelines and Critical events: risk mitigation strategies and guidelines are 
formulated based on the identified critical events. This task is performed by the TI, 
with the technical assistance of the ET. 
All the results in all the steps of PHASE 2 and PHASE 3 are specifically documented by the 
TI. The IR reviews the activities performed in assessments from STEP 4 to STEP 8. The TI, 
with the technical assistance of the ET, update to the final assessments for such steps 
accounting for the review. Final assessments and decisions are documented by the TI. 
Based on such documents, the PM, TI and IR reach the final agreement. 
2.2.4 PHASE 4: Report phase 
The Report phase comprises one step: 
o STEP 9 Results Presentation: presentation of the outcome of stress test to CI 
authorities, regulators and community representatives. This presentation is 
organized and performed by PM and TI. The presentation includes the outcome of 
stress test in terms of the grade, the critical events, the guidelines for risk 
mitigation, and the level of “detail and sophistication” of the methods adopted in 
the stress test. 
Note that the time for this presentation is set in PHASE 1, and it cannot be changed during 
PHASE 2 and 3.  
2.3 ST@STREST test levels 
Due to the diversity of types of CIs and the potential consequence of failure of the CIs, 
the types of hazards and the available resources for conducting the stress tests, it is not 
optimal to require the most general form of the stress test for all possible situations. 
Therefore, three stress test variants, termed Stress Test Levels (ST-Ls) are proposed: 
o Level 1 (ST-L1): single-hazard component check; 
o Level 2 (ST-L2): single-hazard system-wide risk assessment; 
o Level 3 (ST-L3): multi-hazard system-wide risk assessment. 
Each ST-L is characterized by a different scope (component or system) and by a different 
complexity of the risk analysis (e.g. the consideration of multi-hazard and multi-risk 
events) as shown in Fig. 2.4. 
The aim of the ST-L1 (Component Level Assessment) is to check each component of a CI 
independently in order to show whether the component passes or fails the minimum 
requirements for its performance, which are defined in current design codes. The 
performance of each component of the CI is checked for the hazards selected as the most 
important (e.g. earthquake or flood). At component-level there are three methods to 
perform the single-hazard component check. These methods differ for the complexity and 
the data needed for the computation. The possible approaches are: the hazard-based 
assessment, design-based assessment, and the risk-based assessment approach.  
Since a CI is a system of interacting components, ST-L1 is inherently not adequate. 
Nevertheless, ST-L1 is obligatory because design of (most) CI components is regulated by 
design codes, and the data and the expertise are available. Further, for some CIs, the 
computation of system-level analysis (single- and multi-risk) could be overly demanding 
in terms of available knowledge and resources. 
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Fig. 2.4  ST-Levels in the ST@STREST methodology 
The stress test assessment at the system level of the CI is foreseen at ST-L2 or ST-L3 
where the probabilistic risk analysis of the entire CI (system) is performed. The system 
level assessment is highly recommended, since it is the only way of revealing the majority 
of the mechanisms leading to potential unwanted consequences. However, note that it 
requires more knowledge and resources (e.g. financial, staff) for conducting the stress 
test, thus it is not made obligatory (if not required by regulations).  
At these levels, potentially different implementations are possible. The quantification of 
epistemic uncertainty may not be performed (sub-level a). If performed, it may be based 
either on the evaluations of a single expert (sub-level b) or of multiple-experts (sub-level 
c). Indeed, a more accurate quantification of the technical community knowledge 
distribution (describing the epistemic uncertainty) can be reached if more experts are 
involved in the analysis and, in particular, when dealing with all critical choices.  
Further, in case specific needs have been identified in the Pre-assessment phase (e.g. 
important methodological/modelling gaps) and such requirements cannot be included into 
the risk assessment for whatever reason, scenario-based analysis should be also 
performed as complementary to the system ST-L selected (sub-level d). Levels 2d and 3d 
are complementary to L2c and L3c, respectively. In this case, multiple experts define and 
evaluate possible scenarios that, for whatever reason, cannot be included into probabilistic 
risk analysis. In this case, the choice of performing a scenario-based assessment should 
be justified and documented by the TI, and reviewed by the IR. If scenario-based 
assessment is finally selected, the choice of the scenarios should be based on ad hoc 
expert elicitation experiments of the PoE (SSHAC 1997). These additional scenarios are 
meant to further investigate the epistemic uncertainty by including events otherwise 
neglected only for technical reasons. Indeed, L2d and L3d are performed to evaluate the 
potential impact of epistemic gaps identified by experts, eventually increasing the 
capability of exploring the effective epistemic uncertainty. Thus, it is foreseen only as 
complementary to a full quantification of epistemic uncertainty in a multiple-expert 
framework. 
The system level analysis is thus performed according to: 1) the degree of complexity of 
the analysis (single vs. multi hazards), and 2) the degree of involvement of the technical 
community in taking critical decisions and in the quantification of the epistemic uncertainty 
for the computation of risk. According to these two aspects a subdivision for ST levels has 
been introduced (Fig. 2.4). The selection of the actual procedure to be implemented is 
performed in the Pre-Assessment (Phase 1). These two choices essentially depend on 
regulatory requirements, on the different importance of the CI, and on the available 
human/financial resources to perform the stress test. A practical tool to support the choice 
of the appropriate ST level may be a criticality assessment aimed at identifying and ranking 
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CIs (for example at a national scale). In Esposito et al 2016 (Appendix A) some key factors 
that may be considered to define the criticality of the CIs and a possible methodology to 
rank CIs are presented and discussed. 
In the following, a specific description of all ST-Ls and sub-levels is reported. 
2.3.1 Component level assessment 
At Component Level Assessment only one implementation is foreseen, i.e. the ST-L1a. 
This level requires less knowledge and resources (financial, staff, experts) for conducting 
the stress test in comparison to the system level assessment, but it is obligatory because 
design of (most) CI components is regulated by design codes, and usually, both the data 
and the experts are available. Further, for some CIs, the computation of system-level 
analysis (single- and multi-risk) could be overly demanding in terms of available 
knowledge and resources. 
Only the TI is required as expert contributing to critical scientific decision, while the whole 
process may require up to five experts to assist the TI in technical decisions. The TI selects 
the most important hazard to consider in the component-level analysis but, if more than 
one hazard is considered critical for the CI under study, more than one Level 1 check 
should be performed, one for each hazard. 
Three methods to perform the single-hazard component check are proposed in 
ST@STREST, and they differ for the complexity and the data needed for the computation. 
The possible approaches are: the hazard-based assessment, design-based assessment 
and the risk-based assessment approach. A detailed description is provided in the 
following. 
The main aspects characterizing the ST-L1a are summarized in Table 2.1. 
 
Hazard-based assessment: The performance of the component is checked by 
comparing the design value of intensity of the hazard which was actually used in the design 
of the component (building, pipeline, storage tank, etc.), IDesign phase, to the design value of 
intensity of the hazard prescribed in current regulatory documents or to the value of 
intensity according to the best possible knowledge, IAssessment phase. The complexity of such 
an assessment phase is not high. As a consequence, the level of “detail and sophistication” 
of this type of assessment is considered moderate, since all other design factors (e.g. 
minimum requirements for detailing, material safety factors, design procedures, type of 
analysis, safety margin) and their impact on the performance of the components, which 
can also change from different versions of regulatory documents, are neglected in the 
assessment. The outcome of this type of assessment phase is qualitative: 
o In compliance with the design level of hazard (IAssessment phase ≤ IDesign phase); 
o Not in compliance with the design level of hazard (IAssessment phase ≥ IDesign phase); 
o The design level of hazard is unknown. This outcome is assigned when there is no 
regulatory document which would require design of the component for considered 
type of hazard at the time of performing the stress test. 
Hazard-based assessment may be used in cases when the component has not been 
designed using modern design codes and when the component is not significant for the 
system response. In such cases, the target level of detail is expected to be set to Moderate 
(see Section 2.6), which would allow the method to be used. However, if the target level 
is set to High or Advanced, a more accurate method should be used (i.e. design- or risk-
based assessment, respectively) to evaluate the components and avoid imposition of 
penalty factors. Moreover, due to the trend of increasing design levels of hazard over time, 
the outcome of the hazard-based assessment is expected, in a vast majority of cases, to 
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be “Not in compliance with the design level of hazard”, which would, again, require a more 
accurate method to be utilized. 
 
Design-based assessment: The level of “detail and sophistication” of this type of 
assessment is higher than the previous method since it is based on the design state-of-
practice. The expert compares the demand, D, with the capacity, C, (expressed in terms 
of forces, stresses, deformations or displacements). The assessment can be based on 
factoring the results from the existing design documentation or by performing design 
(assessment) of the component according to the current state-of-practice. The decision-
making regarding the sufficiency of the investigated component is sometimes difficult, 
since the demand in the design is most often based on linear-elastic analysis while the 
performance objectives of the component are often associated with its nonlinear behavior. 
Alternatively, the performance assessment can be based on nonlinear methods of analysis. 
The complexity of this type of assessment may differ, depending on the type of analysis 
(linear, nonlinear) used. The outcome of the design-based assessment is qualitative: 
o In compliance with the code (D ≤ C); 
o Not in compliance with the code (D ≥ C); 
o The design objectives for this type of hazard are not defined. This outcome is 
assigned when there is no regulatory document which would require design of 
thecomponent for considered type of hazard at the time of performing the stress 
test. 
Risk-based assessment: The hazard function at the location of the component and the 
fragility function of the component are required for this type of performance assessment. 
The level of ”detail and sophistication” of this type of assessment varies from Moderate to 
Advanced, which depends on the level used for evaluation of the hazard function and the 
fragility function. These two functions can then be convolved in the risk integral in order 
to obtain the probability of exceedance of a designated limit state in a period of time (PLS). 
In general, the risk integral can be solved numerically. Under some conditions, simple 
closed-form solutions of risk integral also exist. The target probability of exceedance of a 
designated limit state for a period of time (PLS,t) also has to be defined for each component 
and different limit states (e.g. loss of function, low/medium/high damage, collapse) if they 
are considered in this assessment (e.g. probability of exceedance implied by the code). 
The complexity of risk-based assessment is in general high, but it can be reduced to low 
when the hazard and fragility functions are already available. Such situation occurs if the 
ST-L2 or ST-L3 assessments are also foreseen in the stress test. In this case the ST-L1 
assessment and system level assessment should be partly performed in parallel. The 
outcome of the risk-based assessment is quantitative, since the performance of the 
component is measured by the estimated PLS, which is then used as a basis for the grading 
(see Section 2.5). 
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Table 2.1  Main aspects characterizing the Component Level Assessment (STL-1a) 
Level ST-L1a 
Events considered Single hazard check. Hazard selected as the most important 
(e.g. earthquake or flood, etc.). If more than one hazard is 
important, more than one Level 1 check should be performed. 
Number of experts 
contributing to 
critical scientific 
decisions 
1 (the TI) 
Total number of 
experts involved in 
the process 
< 5 (the TI, along with the technical assistance of the ET formed 
by few individuals internal to the CI, and an IR with 1 expert)  
 
Method: The performance of each component of the CI is checked using 
the hazard-based assessment, design-based assessment or 
risk-based assessment approach. Design-based assessment is 
recommended when only ST-L1 is performed. In the case when 
ST-L1 is followed by ST-L2, in which component-specific 
fragility functions are used, it makes sense to perform risk-
based assessment of the components since fragility function are 
anyway required in ST-L2. 
Core actors PM, TI + ET, IR 
The three methods described above for a single hazard check at component level 
assessment is demonstrated by means of an example of a precast reinforced concrete 
industrial building (single-storey precast reinforced concrete building with masonry infills 
on the perimeter, Fig. 2.5) located in Ljubljana (Slovenia). 
 
Fig. 2.5  Plan view of the case study building from ST-L1 assessment 
The structure was designed before the introduction of the Eurocode standards and it 
consists of cantilever columns, which are connected by an assembly of roof elements. It 
has two bays in the X direction and three bays in the Y direction. The distance between 
the columns in the X and Y directions are 17.4 m and 8.7 m, respectively, whereas the 
height of the columns amounts to 10.3 m. The critical components of the building are 
columns and beam-to-column connections. The ratios of longitudinal and transverse 
reinforcement in all columns amount to 1.29 % and 0.10 %, respectively. No connections 
between beams and columns are provided. The total mass of the structure amounts to 
237 t. 
The design peak ground acceleration for the 475 and 2475 year earthquakes amount to 
0.25 g and 0.35 g, respectively. The ground is classified as B (CEN, 2005a). 
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Hazard-based assessment 
No information on the hazard used in the design of the component is available. It is 
therefore concluded that the component was not designed to withstand seismic loading. 
The outcome of the hazard-based assessment is: “The design level of hazard is unknown”. 
 
Design-based assessment for Limit State of Near Collapse 
Eurocode 8 Part 3 (CEN, 2005b) is used to conduct the design-based assessment of the 
component. The knowledge level, as required by the code, is identified as »limited«. 
Consequently, confidence factor amounts to 1.35. The limit state of Near Collapse, which 
corresponds to the return period of 2475 years, is checked. Lateral force analysis is 
selected.  
Table 2.2 summarizes the results of the assessment in terms of verification of beam-to-
column connections. As shown in the table, connections above the corner columns do not 
meet requirements, which means that the building does not comply with the code. Further 
assessment of the columns is not performed since it can be concluded that the outcome 
of the design-based assessment is: “Not in compliance with the code (D ≥ C)”.  
The detailed explanation of the calculations are reported in Deliverable 5.1 (Esposito et al, 
2016). 
Table 2.2  Verification of beam-to-column connections 
Column Capacity of columns in terms 
of MRd [kNm] (material 
characteristics are multiplied 
by the confidence factor) 
Dconn [kN] Cconn [kN] (material 
characteristics are 
divided by the 
confidence factor) 
Internal 527 26 143 
Side X 487 47 72 
Side Y 487 24 36 
Corner 466 45 36 
Risk-based assessment 
Fragility function for the collapse limit state and hazard function are required in order to 
estimate the risk. In this case fragility function is determined by conducting non-linear 
dynamic analyses using a set of hazard consisting ground motions. The numerical model 
of the building is defined using the principles described in Babič and Dolšek (2016) and 
Crowley et al (2015). Based on the results of the numerical simulations a regression 
analysis is carried out by assuming a lognormal distribution and by using the maximum 
likelihood method as proposed in previous studies (e.g. Baker, 2015). The geometric mean 
of the spectral accelerations in both horizontal components at 1.9 s is chosen as an 
intensity measure. The parameters of the resulting fragility function (Fig. 2.6a), i.e. the 
median CIM and the standard deviation in the log domain βC, are 0.22 g and 0.40, 
respectively.   
The seismic hazard curve (Fig. 2.6b) is determined based on the probabilistic seismic 
hazard analysis (PSHA) used for the development of seismic hazard maps in Slovenia 
(Lapajne et al 2003). It is idealized by a linear function on a log-log plot, expressed as: 
 0H( )
k
IM k IM

                        (2.1) 
Interval from 0.25∙ IM  and 1.25∙ IM  was chosen for the idealization of the hazard curve, 
as proposed by Dolšek and Fajfar (2008). The parameters of the idealized hazard curve 
k0,C and kC amount to 4.8∙10-5 and 1.75, respectively. The resulting probability of 
exceedance of the collapse limit state is determined as follows: 
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Fig. 2.6  a) Fragility function of the building and b) seismic hazard on the location of the 
building 
2.3.2 System level assessment 
The system level assessment requires more knowledge and resources for conducting the 
stress test compared to the Component Level Assessment. Thus, it is not made obligatory. 
However, the system level assessment represents the only way of revealing the paths that 
lead to potential unwanted consequences. Therefore, it is highly recommended. 
Different implementations are possible, according to: 
o The consideration of a single hazard (STL-2) or of multiple-hazard/risks (STL-3). 
o The quantification of epistemic uncertainty may not be performed (sub-level a). 
o The use of a single expert (sub-level b) or of multiple-experts (sub-level c) to 
quantify the epistemic uncertainty. 
Single hazard (ST-L2) 
For the single hazard system level check, three sublevels are foreseen according to the 
degree of involvement of the technical community in taking critical decisions and in the 
quantification of the Epistemic Uncertainty (EU) for the computation of risk. The 
quantification of EU may not be performed (ST-L2a). If performed, it may be either based 
on the evaluations of a single expert (ST-L2b) or of multiple-experts (ST-L2c). 
As for ST-L1a for the ST-L2a, only the TI is required as expert contributing to the critical 
scientific decision, while the whole process may require up to five experts to assist the TI 
in technical decisions. ST-L2b, instead, requires the use of up to nine experts (the ET 
formed by few individuals internal to the CI and a few external experts, and an IR with 
more than one expert) to assist the TI. The ST-L2c requires even more knowledge and 
resources. In this case more than six experts are required to contribute to scientific 
decisions (the TI and a PoE formed by at least six experts), while the whole process may 
require more than ten experts. 
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Regarding the methods to apply for the risk analysis, for all the sublevels the aim is to 
evaluate the performance of the whole CI. In a generic format, the process is independent 
of the field of application. The process can be divided into the following steps (AS/NZS 
4360): definition of context, definition of system, hazard identification, analysis of 
consequences and analysis of probability (or frequency), risk assessment and risk 
treatment. Several methods/techniques exist for each of the main steps. They can be 
classified as qualitative or quantitative (Faber and Stewart, 2003). A list of some of the 
methods usually applied in risk assessment of engineering facilities is provided in Esposito 
et al, 2016. 
In ST@STREST, for all sub-levels of the system-level assessment, probabilistic (i.e. 
probabilistic risk analysis, PRA) methods are foreseen. PRA is a systematic and 
comprehensive methodology to evaluate risks associated with every life-cycle aspect of a 
complex engineered entity, where the severity of consequence(s) and their likelihood of 
occurrence are both expressed qualitatively (Bedford and Cooke, 2001). It can be also 
found in the literature under the names of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) or 
probabilistic safety assessment (PSA).  
The final result of a PRA is a risk curve and the associated uncertainties (aleatory and 
epistemic). The risk curve generally represents the frequency of exceeding a consequence 
value as a function of that consequence values. PRA can be performed for internal initiating 
events (e.g. system or operator errors) as well as for external initiating events (e.g. 
natural hazards).  
Main applications of PRA have been performed in different fields such as civil, aeronautic, 
nuclear, and chemical engineering. The specific quantitative method to use depends upon 
the context in which the risk is placed (the hazard context), and upon the system under 
consideration. In civil engineering, PRA methods were developed for the analysis of 
structural reliability, using analytical or numerical integration, simulation, moment-based 
methods, or first- and second-order methods (FORM/SORM). In earthquake engineering, 
the state of the art of probabilistic and quantitative approaches for the estimation of 
seismic risk relies on performance-based earthquake engineering (PBEE). PBEE is the 
framework that enables engineers to assess if a new or an existing structure is adequate 
in the sense that it performs as desired at various levels of seismic excitation. Different 
analytical approaches to PBEE have been developed in the last years: the approach 
pursued by the Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research (PEER) Center is the most 
representative (Cornell and Krawinkler, 2000). This approach was originally developed for 
buildings (i.e., point-like structures). However, in the years, a significant body of research 
was developed focusing on risk assessment of infrastructure systems. PBEE was extended 
to spatially distributed systems such as gas or electric networks (Esposito et al, 2015; 
Cavalieri et al, 2014), transportation networks (Argyroudis et al, 2015), and 
telecommunication networks (Esposito et al, in prep.). 
For the three CI classes identified in STREST and for the specific hazard considered, the 
detail list and explanation of possible methods that may be applied to assess the 
performance and the risk of the CI, are provided in STREST Deliverable 4.1 (Salzano et al, 
2016), 4.2 (Kakderi et al, 2015) and 4.3 (Crowley et al, 2015). 
Epistemic uncertainties are treated only at ST-L2b and ST-L2c. The goal is the assessment 
of the “community distribution”, that is, a distribution describing “the center, the body, 
and the range of technical interpretations that the larger technical community would have 
if they were to conduct the study” (SSHAC). Here, “community distribution” means “the 
probability distribution representing the epistemic uncertainty within the community”. This 
assessment goal is achieved by: selecting a number of appropriate alternative scientifically 
acceptable models, and weighting them according to their subjective credibility. The 
selection of models may be based on the development of Alternative Trees (more details 
can be found in Deliverable 3.1, Selva et al 2015), where the analysis is divided into a 
number of consecutive steps, and alternative models are defined at each step. The 
procedure to be followed in these tasks is different for ST-L2b and ST-L2c. In ST-L2b, the 
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TI (supported by the ET) selects the models based on a literature review, and assigns the 
weights to each one of them. At ST-L2c, a more robust procedure is foreseen (see STREST 
Deliverable 3.1, Selva et al 2015). In ST@STREST PHASE 1 (pre-assessment), a 
preliminary list of models is prepared by the TI (supported by the ET), which is formally 
screened by the PoE and reviewed by the IR. Then, at the beginning of ST@STREST PHASE 
2 (assessment), an expert elicitation of the PoE is organized by the TI to assign the weights 
of the models (for example, following an AHP procedure, see STREST Deliverable 3.1, 
Selva et al 2015). Then, the ET implements models and weights in order to produce the 
“community distribution”, implementing methodologies like the Logic Tree (e.g., Bommer 
and Scherbaum, 2008) or the Ensemble Modelling (Marzocchi et al 2015). Note that the 
selection of the models depends on the adopted strategy for their integration (see STREST 
Deliverable 3.1, Selva et al, 2015). For example, Logic Trees require that models form a 
MECE (Mutually Exclusive and Collectively Exhaustive) set, while Ensemble Modelling 
simply requires that models form an unbiased set of alternatives representing the 
epistemic uncertainty into the community.   
The main aspects characterizing each sub level of the ST-L2 are summarized in Tables 
2.3-2.5. 
Table 2.3  Main aspects characterizing the System Level Assessment, STL-2a 
Level ST-L2a 
Events considered Single hazard, selected as the most important (e.g. earthquake, 
flood) 
Number of experts 
contributing to 
critical scientific 
decisions 
1 (the TI) 
Total number of 
experts involved in 
the process 
Up to 5 (the TI, along with the technical assistance of the ET 
formed by few individuals internal to the CI, and an IR with 1 
expert) 
Method: Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA, e.g. PBEE framework for 
seismic hazard) 
Core actors PM, TI + ET, IR 
Table 2.4  Main aspects characterizing the System Level Assessment, ST-L2b. 
Level ST-L2b 
Events considered Single hazard, selected as the most important (e.g. earthquake, 
flood) 
Number of experts 
contributing to 
critical scientific 
decisions 
1 (the TI) 
Total number of 
experts involved in 
the process 
Up to 10 (the TI, along with the technical assistance of the ET 
formed by few individuals internal to the CI and a few external 
experts, and an IR with > 1 experts) 
 
Method: Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA, e.g. PBEE framework for 
seismic hazard) + epistemic uncertainty   
Core actors PM, TI + ET, IR 
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Table 2.5  Main aspects characterizing the System Level Assessment, ST-L2c. 
Level ST-L2c 
Events considered Single hazard, selected as the most important (e.g earthquake, 
flood) 
Number of experts 
contributing to 
critical scientific 
decisions 
> 6 (the TI and a PoE formed by > 5 experts)  
 
Total number of 
experts involved in 
the process 
> 10 (the TI, along with the technical assistance of the ET 
formed by few individuals internal to the CI and a few external 
experts, the PoE formed by > 5 experts, and an IR with > 1 
experts) 
Method: Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA, e.g. PBEE framework for 
seismic hazard) + epistemic uncertainty   
Core actors PM, TI + ET, PoE , IR 
Multiple hazards/risks 
As for the ST-L2c, the assessment process requires more than six experts to contribute to 
scientific decisions (the TI and a PoE formed by at least six experts), and a total of more 
than ten experts (the TI, along with the technical assistance of the ET formed by few 
individuals internal to the CI and a few external experts, the PoE formed by more than 
five experts, and an IR with more than one expert) to complete the whole process.  
There is no standard approach for multi-risk assessment. Different methods could be used, 
taken from the scientific literature. For example, Liu et al (2015) could be used to identify 
the multi-risk assessment level required (semi-quantitative vs. quantitative); Marzocchi 
et al (2012) combined with Selva (2013) could be used when the number of interactions 
at the hazard and/or risk levels remains limited, and Mignan et al (2014; 2016a) could be 
used when the number of interactions becomes significant (roughly more than 3-4 domino 
effects). The Bayesian approach of Marzocchi et al (2012) has the advantage of coupling 
to the PEER PBEE method (Cornell and Krawinkler 2000; Der Kiureghian 2005), which is 
already well known to the seismic engineers and relates to the lower stress test levels (L1 
and L2). Selva (2013) proposed a method to test potential individual interactions at the 
risk level (in vulnerability and/or exposure), and to eventually include them into the 
assessment using the PEER PBEE formula. Moreover, other PEER PBEE-based methods, 
such as damage-dependent vulnerability methods (Iervolino et al, 2016) and loss 
disaggregation, can easily be added to such a general multi-risk framework. The Generic 
Multi-Risk (GenMR) framework developed by Mignan et al (2014), on the other hand, is 
purely stochastic (a variant of a Markov Chain Monte Carlo method) and not derived from 
existing single-risk assessment approaches. It is therefore more flexible when including a 
multitude of perils (i.e., it is not earthquake-focused) but at the same time, requires some 
adaptation from the modeler to develop a multi-risk model on GenMR (i.e., all events 
defined in a stochastic event set, all interactions defined in a hazard correlation matrix, 
process memory defined from time-dependent or event-dependent variables). While 
GenMR could be used for a seismic multi-risk analysis (see Mignan et al, 2015), advantages 
become more obvious in more complex cases, such as interactions between different 
hazards (e.g., earthquake, flooding, erosion) and different infrastructure elements (e.g., 
hydropower, spillway and bottom outlet failures) at a hydropower dam (Matos et al, 2015; 
Mignan et al, 2015). Whatever the method used, the final output should be a probabilistic 
risk result in the form of probabilities of exceeding different loss levels, a risk or a loss 
curve. The multi-risk loss curves shall then be compared to the ones generated in stress 
test levels L1 and L2, and differences identified. The main cause of risk should be 
investigated, by disaggregation (e.g., Iervolino et al, 2016) or by GenMR time series 
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ranking and metadata analysis (Mignan et al, 2014; Matos et al, 2015; Mignan et al, 2015; 
2016a). 
The treatment of EUs in ST-L3c is similar to the one described for ST-L2c. In addition, in 
ST@STREST PHASE 1, it is foreseen that the selection of the hazards and hazard 
interactions to be included is based on the results of an expert elicitation procedure of the 
PoE (for example, based on a qualitative risk analysis made through verbal scale, see the 
case study of the Harbor facilities of Thessaloniki in STREST ERR5, Pitilakis et al, 2016). 
The main aspects characterizing the ST-L3 are summarized in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6  Main aspects characterizing the System Level Assessment, ST-L3c. 
Level ST-L3c 
Events considered Multi-hazards (multi-hazard, i.e. coinciding events and multi-
risk) 
Number of experts 
contributing to 
critical scientific 
decisions 
> 6 (the TI and a PoE formed by > 5 experts)  
 
Total number of 
experts involved in 
the process 
> 10 (the TI, along with the technical assistance of the ET 
formed by few individuals internal to the CI and a few external 
experts, the PoE formed by > 5 experts, and an IR with > 1 
experts) 
 
Method: Multi-risk analysis (extension of PRA methodology for multi-
risk) + epistemic uncertainty  
Core actors PM, TI + ET, PoE , IR 
Scenario-based assessment 
Scenario-based analysis may be performed as complementary to ST-L2c and ST-L3c due 
to methodological gaps identified for specific events/hazards that cannot be formally 
included into the PRA. This means that it should be considered only if, for technical 
reasons, one important phenomenon cannot be included into a formal probabilistic 
framework (e.g., PRA for ST-L2c). In this case, the choice of performing a scenario-based 
assessment should be justified and documented by the TI, and reviewed by the IR. If 
scenario-based assessment is finally selected, the choice of the scenarios should be based 
on ad-hoc expert elicitation experiments of the PoE (see Selva et al, 2015).  
Different strategies can be adopted in organizing the elicitation experiment and in 
preparing the documentation for the PoE. For example, the hazard correlation matrix 
(HCM), one of the main inputs to the GenMR framework (see above), can also be used 
qualitatively to build more or less complex scenarios of cascading hazardous events. The 
HCM is a square matrix with trigger events defined in rows and target events (the same 
list of events) in columns. In ST-L3c, each cell of the HCM is defined as a conditional 
probability of occurrence. In a deterministic view, cells can be filled by plus “+” signs for 
positive interactions (triggering), minus “-” signs for negative interactions (inhibiting) and 
empty “Ø” signs for no known interactions (supposedly independent events). The HCM has 
recently been shown to be a cognitive tool that promotes transformative learning on 
extreme event cascading. In other words, it allows defining more or less complex scenarios 
from the association of simple one-to-one interacting couples. Once the modus operandi 
is understood, more knowledge on multi-risk can be generated (Mignan et al, 2016b). The 
core actors could use the HCM tool to define the list of relevant events as well as to discuss 
the space of possible interactions in an intuitive interactive way. ST-L3d scenarios would 
then emerge from the HCM tool. 
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The main aspects characterizing the scenario-based assessment are summarized in Table 
2.7. 
Table 2.7  Main aspects characterizing the complementary scenario-based assessment 
Level ST-L2d ST-L3d 
Events considered “Black swan”, i.e. events not previously considered (e.g. multi-
hazard, correlated events) and for which a PRA is not feasible 
due to lack of procedures and basic knowledge. This possibility 
should be confirmed by the IR (Internal Reviewers). The PoE 
(Pool of Experts) is asked to define such scenarios.  
Number of experts 
contributing to 
critical scientific 
decisions 
Same of ST-L2c or ST-L3c. 
 
Total number of 
experts involved in 
the process 
Same of ST-L2c or ST-L3c.  
 
Method: Scenario-based risk assessment (SBRA) 
Core actors PM, TI + ET, PoE , IR 
2.4 ST@STREST data structures 
A CI is a complex assembly of components, structures and systems designed to provide a 
service, in terms of generation and flow of water, electric power, natural gas, oil, or goods 
in the scope of the built environment of a community. The data on the components, 
structures and systems of the CI needs to be assembled and held in a framework to 
facilitate the application of the proposed stress test methodology and the execution of a 
stress test. The data on the CI includes not only the information about the hazard and the 
vulnerability of the components and structures, but also the information about the 
functioning of the system that includes the topology of the system, the links that describe 
the interactions between the components and structures, and the causal relations between 
the events in the system. 
Representation of complex systems for a probabilistic risk analysis in general, and accident 
sequence investigation in particular, has been done since the early 1970’s in the nuclear 
industry. There, the event and fault trees are used to represent the system information 
necessary to conduct a probabilistic risk analysis.  
An event tree is a graphical representation of the various accident sequences that can 
occur as a result of an initiating event (USNRC 2012). It is an essential tool in analyzing 
whether a complex system satisfies its system-level design targets. It provides a rational 
framework for enumerating and, subsequently, evaluating the myriad of events and 
sequences that can affect the operation of the CI system. 
A fault tree is an analytical model that graphically depicts the logical combinations of faults 
(i.e., hardware failures and/or human errors) that can lead to an undesired state (i.e., 
failure mode) for a particular subsystem or component (Vesely et al 1981). This undesired 
state serves as the topmost event in the fault tree, and usually corresponds to a top event 
in an event tree. Thus, a fault tree provides a rational framework for identifying the 
combinations of hardware failures and/or human errors that can result in a particular 
failure mode of a subsystem or component. Once fully developed, a fault tree can be used 
to quantitatively evaluate the role of a CI subsystem or component in the operation and 
failure of the CI system.  
A particular graphical combination of a fault tree and an event tree, called the bow-tie 
model (De Dianous and Fiévez 2006), has been used in risk management since the 1980’s 
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to visually represent the possible causes and consequences of an accident. Typically, the 
causes of an accident are shown on the left side using a fault tree, while the consequences 
of an accident are shown on the right side using an event tree. 
Bayesian networks (BNs) are probabilistic models that provide an efficient framework for 
probabilistic assessment of component/system performance and can be used to model 
multiple hazards and their interdependencies2. They may also facilitate information 
updating for near-real time and post-event applications. Evidence on one or more variables 
can be entered in a BN model to provide an up-to-date probabilistic characterization of the 
performance of the system. BN is nowadays used for infrastructure risk assessment and 
decision support, particularly in the aftermath of a natural event (Bensi, 2010).  
Similar to event and fault trees, thus also bowties, the topology of a BN is derived from 
an analysis of the system and remains static. This means that the component, structures 
and subsystems and the causal links and conditional dependencies among them are pre-
determined and do not change during the probabilistic risk analysis process. There are, 
however, so-called adaptive (Pascale and Nicoli 2011) or reconfigurable (Mirmoeini and 
Krishnamurthy 2005) BNs whose topology changes (among several pre-determined 
topologies) to best match an estimate of the varying state of the modeled system. Finally, 
there are modular BNs (Niel et al 2000), built out of many BN modules, with each module 
representing a functionally independent component or subsystem of a system-level BN 
(Park and Cho, 2012).  
More important, the probabilistic nature of the two frameworks is different: the event/fault 
tree framework is based on the notion of probability as a frequency, while the BN 
framework represents the state of knowledge or belief. Fundamentally, the BN framework 
naturally allows for introduction of new knowledge, for example, from observations of the 
CI system behavior during its normal operation, from inspections, or from previous stress 
tests. This enables a fundamental aspect of the proposed stress test methodology, that of 
repeating a stress test in certain intervals depending on the outcome of the previous stress 
test in order to reduce the risk exposure of the CI through the practice of continuous 
improvement. 
2.4.1 Application of BNs to natural hazards and CIs 
The use of BNs for natural hazard assessment has increased in recent years. Straub (2005) 
presented a generic framework for the assessment of the risks associated with natural 
hazards using BNs and applied it to the rockfall hazard. BNs have also been applied to the 
modeling of risks due to typhoon (Nishijima and Faber 2007), geotechnical and 
hydrological risks posed to a single embankment dam (Smith, 2006), avalanches (Grêt-
Regamey and Straub 2006), liquefaction modeling (Bayraktarli et al 2005, 2006, 
Tasfamariam and Liu, 2014), tsunami early warning (Blaser et al 2009) and seismic risk 
(Bayraktarkli et al 2005, 2006, 2011; Bensi, 2010; Broglio, 2011). 
In particular, regarding seismic risk, Bayraktarkli et al (2005, 2006) proposed a three 
components framework (Fig. 2.7) for earthquake risk management using BNs, composed 
of an exposure model that is an indicator of hazard potential, a vulnerability model which 
is an indicator of direct/immediate consequences, and a robustness model to quantify 
indirect consequences. However, the framework proposed by the authors does not include 
many aspects which complicate the applications of BNs to seismic hazard and risk analysis 
of infrastructure systems such as the modeling of ground motion random fields, directivity 
effects, or issues associated with the modeling of system performance.  
Bensi (2010) proposed a more comprehensive BN methodology for performing 
infrastructure seismic risk assessment that includes also a decision model for post-event 
                                           
2 A short introduction to BNs terminology and probabilistic structure is available in Deliverable 5.2 
(Esposito and Stojadinovic, 2016a). 
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decision making (Fig. 2.8). The methodology developed by Bensi (2010) consists of four 
major components: i) a seismic demand model where ground motion intensities are 
modelled as Gaussian random field accounting for multiple seismic sources and including 
finite fault rupture and directivity effects; ii) a performance model of point-like and 
distributed components; iii) models of system performance as a function of component 
states; and iv) the extension of the BN to include decision and utility nodes to aid post-
earthquake decision-making.  
 
Fig. 2.7  BN framework for seismic risk management (source: Bayraktarli et al, 2005) 
In addition to demonstrating the value of using Bayesian networks for seismic 
infrastructure risk assessment and decision support, the study proposed models necessary 
to construct efficient Bayesian networks with the goal of minimizing computational 
demands, which represent one of the weak points of BN frameworks. 
More recently Grauvogl and Steentoft (2016) and Didier et al (2017) proposed a BN-based 
model to evaluate the seismic resilience of infrastructure systems. The model is based on 
the compositional supply/demand resilience quantification framework presented in the 
STREST Deliverable 4.5 report (Stojadinovic and Esposito, 2016).  
A schematic overview of this BN-based model used to evaluate the resilience of the electric 
power supply system in Nepal after the 2015 Gorkha earthquake is shown in Fig. 2.9. 
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Fig. 2.8  Bayesian network methodology for seismic infrastructure risk assessment and 
decision support proposed by Bensi (2010) 
2.4.2 Discussions 
Bayesian networks are useful tools in engineering risk analysis because they facilitate the 
computation, the understanding and the communication of complex problems subject to 
uncertainty.  
BNs offer several important advantages. BNs provide an efficient framework for 
probabilistic assessment of component/system performance and can be used to model 
multiple hazards and their interdependencies. They are an efficient and intuitive graphical 
tool that enable representation of the components and subsystems and the causal links 
and conditional dependencies among them and assessment of systems under uncertainty. 
They provide a consistent and clear treatment of the joint probability distributions of 
multiple random variables, and an efficient framework for probabilistic real-time updating 
in light of new evidence. BN can be also be extended to include utility and decision nodes, 
thus providing a decision tool for ranking different alternatives. Complex BNs can be 
constructed using verified and validated modules that represent components and 
subsystems of the CI system. 
Fundamentally, the BN framework naturally allows for introduction of new knowledge, for 
example, from observations of the CI system behavior during its normal operation, from 
inspections, or from previous stress tests. This enables a crucial aspect of the proposed 
stress test methodology, that of repeating a stress test in certain intervals depending on 
the outcome of the previous stress test in order to reduce the risk exposure of the CI 
through the practice of continuous improvement. 
However, Bayesian networks have limitations. Calculations in Bayesian networks can be 
highly demanding and the application to distributed systems characterized by a complex 
topology is not always feasible. An accurate modeling via BNs requires thorough 
understanding of the problem. The need for expert knowledge in generating the 
preliminary BN structure represents one of the most salient points of this tool. Modeling 
complex systems via BNs may require trade-offs between accuracy, transparency, 
computational complexity, and detail of modeling (Friis-Hansen 2004). 
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Further, the availability of statistical data to develop robust models to relate random 
variables in a BN is often scarce in civil engineering and infrastructure system analysis 
(Bensi, 2010). Thus, dependence relations between parents and children and the marginal 
distributions of root nodes should be based on theoretical models and/or expert 
judgement. 
Although BNs represent an appropriate framework to handle uncertainty for pre- and post-
event risk assessment and decision support analysis, it is important to acknowledge that 
challenges remain, particularly with respect to computational demands for application to 
large civil infrastructure systems. 
 
Fig. 2.9  BN model proposed by Didier et al (2017) 
2.5 ST@STREST grading system 
The first outcome of the stress test, obtained in the STEP 6 (Risk Objectives Check), is 
described using a grading system (Esposito et al 2016). This grading systems is based on 
the comparison of the results of risk assessment with the risk objectives (i.e. acceptance 
criteria) defined at the beginning of the test in STEP 2 (Risk Measures and Objectives).  
The proposed grading system (Fig. 2.10) is composed of three different outcomes: Pass, 
Partly Pass, and Fail. The CI passes the stress test if it attains grade AA or A. The former 
grade corresponds to negligible risk and is expected to be the attained risk objective for 
new CIs, whereas the latter grade corresponds to risk being as low as reasonably 
practicable (ALARP, Helm, 1996; Jonkman et al, 2003) and is expected to be the attained 
risk objective for existing CIs. Further, the CI partly passes the stress test if it receives 
grade B, which corresponds to the existence of possibly unjustifiable risk. Finally, the CI 
fails the stress test if it is given grade C, which corresponds to the existence of intolerable 
risk. 
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Fig. 2.10  An example of grading system for the outcome of stress test. The CI may 
pass, partly pass, or fail the stress test 
In the following sections, the risk limits and the boundaries between grades are first 
discussed. This is followed by the description of how the grading system is extended 
considering the time dimension. The guidelines for the grading of individual components 
are then given. A generalization of the grading system is made in order to apply it to those 
ST levels which take into account epistemic uncertainties and system analysis. Finally, a 
brief discussion is given.  
2.5.1 Risk limits and boundaries between grades 
The project manager (PM) of the stress test defines the boundaries between grades (i.e. 
the risk objectives) by following requirements of the regulators. The boundaries (i.e. the 
acceptance risk levels, see STREST Deliverable 5.1, Esposito et al 2016) can be expressed 
using scalar (Fig. 2.11 top) or continuous (Fig. 2.11 bottom) risk measures. Examples of 
the former include the annual probability of the risk measure (e.g. loss of life) and the 
expected value of the risk measure (e.g. expected number of fatalities per year), whereas 
the latter is often represented by an F-N curve, where F represents the cumulative 
frequency of the risk measure (N) per given period of time. In several countries, an F-N 
curve is defined as a straight line on a log-log plot. However, the parameters of these 
curves, as well as parameters of scalar risk objectives (i.e. regulatory boundaries in 
general) may differ between countries and industries (STREST Deliverable 5.1, Esposito 
et al 2016). Harmonizing the risk objectives of risk measures across a range of interests 
on the European level remains to be done. This is a task for regulatory bodies and for 
industry association: they should reconcile the societal and industry interest and develop 
mutually acceptable risk limits. When acceptance criteria are defined as continuous 
measures, the grade is assigned based on the position of the farthest point of the CI loss 
curve from the F-N limits (Fig. 2.11). 
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Fig. 2.11  Grading system in time domain using scalar risk objectives (top) and limit F-N 
curves (bottom): a) two different results of the first evaluation of stress test (ST1), b) 
redefinition of the parameters of the grading system due to Result 1 in ST1, and c) 
redefinition of the parameters of the grading system due to Result 2 in ST1 
2.5.2 Grading system in time domain 
In general, the CI performance can be understood as time-variant. It may change due to, 
for example, ageing through use, long-term degradation process such as corrosion, effects 
of previous hazard events, man-made events (e.g. terroristic attacks), and change in 
exposure (e.g. population). Such change in performance may lead to an increase of the 
probability of failure or loss of functionality, or exacerbate the consequences of failure 
during the CI system’s lifetime (Fig. 2.10). 
In the proposed grading system, it is foreseen that the performance of the CI and/or the 
performance objectives can change over time. Consequently, the outcome of the stress 
test is also time-variant. For this reason, the stress test is periodic, which is also accounted 
for by the grading system. If the CI passes a stress test (grade AA or A), the risk objectives 
for the next stress test do not change until the next stress test. The longest time between 
successive stress tests should be defined by the regulator considering the cumulative risk. 
However, most of existing CIs will probably obtain grade B or even C, which means that 
the risk is possibly unjustifiable or intolerable, respectively. In these cases, the grading 
system has to stimulate the stakeholders to upgrade the existing CI or to start planning 
tor a new CI in the following stress test cycle. It is proposed that stricter risk objectives 
are used or that the time between the successive stress tests is reduced in order to make 
it possible that stakeholders adequately mitigate the risks posed by the CI in as few 
repetitions of the stress test as possible, which means that the CI will eventually obtain 
grade A or the regulator will require that the operation of CI be terminated. 
The basis for the redefinition of risk objectives in the next stress test is the so-called 
characteristic point of risk. In the case when scalar risk measures are used, the 
characteristic point of risk is represented directly by the results of the risk assessment 
(Fig. 2.11, top). In the case when result of risk assessment is expressed by a loss curve 
in F-N space, the characteristic point is defined by one point of the F-N curve. In general, 
each curve of increasing risk (see Fig. 2.11) results in one point of the F-N curve. The 
curve of increasing risk, associated with the characteristic point is denoted as the 
characteristic curve of increasing risk. It is recommended that the point associated with 
the greatest risk above the ALARP region be selected as the characteristic point (see Fig. 
2.11a). In this case the characteristic point is defined as the point of the F-N curve which 
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is the farthest from the limit F-N curve that represents the boundary between grades (for 
example, grades A and B, and the A-B boundary are shown by the blue line in Fig. 2.11a).  
Once the characteristic point is determined, the grading system parameters for the next 
repetition of the stress test can be defined. If the CI obtains grade B in the first evaluation 
of stress test (ST1, blue dot in Fig. 2.11a), the grading system foresees the reduction of 
the distance between grades B and C (the B-C boundary) in the next stress test (ST2, Fig. 
2.11b). This reduction should be equal to the amount of cumulative risk beyond the ALARP 
region assessed in ST1. This ensures risk equity over two cycles, which may be expressed 
by the following expression: 
ST1 (A-B) (B-C), ST1 (B-C), ST2
R R  = R R                                                                  (2.3) 
where R(A-B) is the A-B boundary, R(B-C),ST1 and R(B-C),ST2 are the B-C boundary in ST1 and 
ST2, respectively, and RST1 is the value of the risk measure assessed in the ST1. Note that 
the left side of the Eq. 2.3 is equal to the amount of risk beyond the ALARP region assessed 
in ST1. Furthermore, if grade C (red dot in Fig. 2.11a) is given in ST1, both the B-C 
boundary and the period until the next stress test ST2 are reduced (Fig. 2.11c). In this 
case, the B-C boundary is set equal to the A-B boundary, since this is the maximum 
possible reduction of the region of possibly unjustifiable risk. Moreover, the reduced period 
until ST2 (tcycle,redefined) is determined on the basis of equity of risk above the ALARP region 
over the two cycles and can be calculated using the following expression: 
(B-C), ST1 (A-B)
cycle,redefined cycle,initial
ST1 (A-B)
R R
t  = t
R R



                                                          (2.4) 
where tcycle,initial is the initial amount of time between two stress tests. 
2.5.3 Grading of the components 
Each component is assessed by at least one method (hazard-based, design-based or risk-
based assessment). Objectives of a hazard-based assessment and a design-based 
assessment are obtained directly from the design codes, whereas the risk objectives need 
to be defined in Step 2 (Risk Measures and Objectives). Similar to the case of system level 
assessment, three thresholds need to be defined (between grades AA and A, between 
grades A and B and between grades B and C) in order to consistently evaluate the 
components of a CI. 
If a less detailed and sophisticated method assessment (see Section 2.6) results in the 
component not being in compliance with the requirements or the requirements are 
unknown, a more sophisticated method may be used. For the Component-Level 
Assessment (STEP 4), three levels of detail and sophistication are defined as Moderate, 
High and Moderate-Advanced for hazard-based assessment, design-based assessment and 
risk-based assessment, respectively. Different levels in the case of risk-based assessment 
exist due to various levels of complexity of hazard and fragility analysis. If the result of a 
hazard-based assessment or a design-based assessment is that the component is in 
compliance with the requirements, a grade A is assigned to the component. If these types 
of assessment result in the component not being in compliance with the requirements or 
the requirements are unknown, a grade C is assigned to the component, or a higher Level 
assessment is required. Note that, if the risk-based assessment is used, the grading 
system at the component level is same as that proposed for the system-level assessment. 
The proposed procedure for the progressive approach in the case of the assessment at the 
level of component and the corresponding grading system is illustrated in Fig. 2.12.  
If a component is assigned grade C, mitigation actions need to be taken. The time in which 
the grade needs to be improved depends on the type of assessment. If a hazard-based or 
a design-based assessment is used, the mitigation has to be made immediately, as the 
component is not in compliance with the current regulatory requirements. If a risk-based 
assessment is used, the time in which the grade has to be improved is determined on the 
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basis of the amount of risk corresponding to the component reaching the designated limit 
state in the time period considered (see Section 2.5.2). 
Component is in 
compliance with 
requirementsHazard-based 
assessment
Design-based 
assessment
Risk-based 
assessment
Start ST-L1 
assessment
Component is not in compliance with 
requirements / The design level of 
hazard is unknown / Hazard-based 
assessment is not performed
Grade A
Grade AA, A, B or C
Grade A
Grade C
Higher level 
assessment?
Higher level 
assessment?
Yes
Component is in 
compliance with 
requirements
Component is not in compliance with 
requirements / The design objectives for 
this type of hazard are not defined / 
Design-based assessment is not performed
No
Grade C
Yes
No
Application of 
the grading 
system
 
Fig. 2.12  Grading of components of the system (ST-L1) 
In this section the grading of the components is applied to the example provided in Section 
2.3.1.  
Risk objectives for the component in terms of probability of collapse, which needed to be 
defined in Step 2, are as follows: 10-6 between grades AA and A, 10-4 between grades A 
and B, and 10-3 between grades B and C. The most stringent risk boundary is 
approximately equal to the target probability of collapse, which is foreseen in building 
codes for frequent or permanent loads, e.g. in Eurocode 0 (CEN, 2004). Those values of 
acceptable probability of collapse are within a magnitude of 10-6. Such a low probability of 
collapse cannot be achieved by employing building codes for earthquake-resistant design 
since the nature of seismic action is completely different than the nature of frequent or 
permanent load. The probability of collapse for buildings designed according to Eurocode 
8 is around magnitude of 10-5. A significantly larger value of target collapse risk (1% in 50 
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years (2∙10-4)) was assumed for new buildings in USA (Luco et al, 2007). As a 
consequence, the risk boundary between grades A and B was set to 10-4, while the risk 
boundary between grades B and C was increased 5 fold. The probability of collapse 5% in 
50 years approximately corresponds to buildings, which were designed and constructed in 
the third quarter of 20th century.  
The procedure is initiated by performing the hazard-based assessment. Since the design 
level of hazard is unknown, there are two options: settle with grade C or move on to the 
design-based assessment. We choose the latter. The design-based assessment results in 
the component not being in compliance with the code, then two options are possible: settle 
with grade C or move on to the risk-based assessment. We choose the latter. This results 
in the probability of collapse equal to 8.5∙10-4. Thus, the component receives grade B, 
which means that no risk mitigation actions are required, but the threshold between grades 
B and C will be reduced to 2.5∙10-4 in the next stress test. 
2.5.4 Grading of the system with consideration of epistemic uncertainties 
The grading system presented in Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 assumes that no epistemic 
uncertainties are related to the assessed risk. Since ST-L2c and ST-L3c consider the effect 
of epistemic uncertainties, the grading system needs to be generalized in a way that it 
accounts for a distribution of values of the risk measure. The grading criteria based on a 
distribution of risk measure values can be formulated in a variety of ways. In this project, 
it is recommended that the mean value of the risk measure distribution be used to assess 
the CIs. Other options, which should be examined in future studies, are discussed in 
Section 2.5.5.  
Furthermore, the grading system for consecutive stress tests, described in Section 2.5.2, 
is based on the cumulative probability of risk measure exceedance in the selected time 
period between two stress tests. For this reason, we determine the left side of Eq. 2.3, i.e. 
the total value of risk above the ALARP region, as the sum of all possible risk values above 
the ALARP region (dashed area in Fig. 2.13), which are weighted by their probability: 
A B
ST1 (A-B) (A-B)
R
R R  = p(R)(R R ) dR


 
( )
                      (2.5) 
In the case of risk measure based on an F-N curve, each curve of increasing risk 
corresponds to a distribution of points from different F-N curves (Fig. 2.13b). The 
characteristic curve of increasing risk is the curve that corresponds to the greatest amount 
of risk above the ALARP region, i.e. where the integral in Eq. (2.4) produces the highest 
value. 
 
Fig. 2.13  Distribution of a risk measure with boundaries of grades in the case of a) a 
scalar risk measure and b) an F-N curve 
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2.5.5 Discussion and future developments 
There are some points of the grading system that need to be discussed and further 
developed as a part of the future studies.  
Firstly, it is yet to be determined how grades of single components should affect the global 
outcome of stress test. For example, if the CI is assigned grade B in the ST-L2 assessment, 
the outcome is a partly pass. However, one or several components may receive grade C 
in the component level assessment. It is unclear how this should affect the global outcome. 
One option would be to change the global outcome of stress test to “fail”, since the 
stakeholders would be required to reduce risk of those components. However, such an 
approach may be too conservative. Another option would be to introduce a complementary 
outcome of stress test, which would address only single components and would be 
independent of the outcome obtained based on systemic level assessment. In this case, 
risk mitigation strategies and guidelines would be defined separately for individual 
components as well. A third option would be to require a system-level assessment in this 
or the subsequent stress test that explicitly accounts for the effects of the offending 
components on the behavior of the system using, for example, the bow-tie approach, to 
identify the causes and the effects of failure of such components.  
Secondly, in case epistemic uncertainty analysis is of concern, it is currently recommended 
that the mean value of the designated risk measure is used. However, other options should 
be investigated. The grade could be based on other quantiles of the risk measure 
distribution, which should be determined by the PM. Guidelines for selection of the 
appropriate risk measure distribution quantile should be developed based on a 
comprehensive parametric study as a part of future developments. Grades could also be 
assigned based on a value of the risk measure corresponding to a specific number of 
standard deviations above the mean, i.e. the confidence level that a specific value of the 
risk measure will not be exceeded. Such approach, the high confidence of low probability 
of failure (HCLPF) is used by the nuclear industry. Again, comprehensive parametric 
studies would be required to select the appropriate number of standard deviations for non-
nuclear critical CIs. Furthermore, grades could depend on the type of adjustments of the 
grading system parameters and the time between successive stress tests. For example, if 
a redefinition of the boundary between grades B and C is required (based on the amount 
of risk above the ALARP region, see Fig. 2.11 and 2.13), grade B would be assigned. If the 
reduction of the time before the next stress test is also required (again based on the 
amount of risk above the ALARP region), grade C would be assigned.  
Thirdly, the proposed grading system requires boundaries (acceptance criteria) to be 
defined between the regions of negligible, ALARP, possibly unjustifiable, and intolerable 
risk. The PM will often need to rely on his or her own judgement when defining these 
boundaries, especially in situations where regulatory requirements do not yet exist. It is 
the matter of future developments to create recommendations for the boundaries of 
different types of performance measures that can be used by the PM of the stress test as 
the guidelines. 
2.6 ST@STREST penalty system 
There is a wide range of methods and models for assessing performance of critical 
infrastructures against natural hazards. These methods cover different levels of detail and 
complexity for each hazard, vulnerability, and risk computation. All models are necessarily 
a simplification of the reality. However, the level of simplification may vary significantly. 
In fact, different models and methods have to be assumed or introduced to describe how 
the hazard and vulnerability interact in time and in space. Furthermore, each combination 
corresponds a different level of detail of the analysis. 
For example, regional seismic hazard assessments and site-specific hazard assessments 
may both represent the input for the risk assessments, however they do differ in the level 
of details related to the hazard analysis (e.g., the description of the natural variability of 
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sources, the details in modelling the propagation from source to target, etc.). In a similar 
way, generic fragility functions and element specific fragility function may be used, but 
again they largely differ in the level of details considered in their quantification. Such 
differences are expected to significantly influence the reliability of the risk results. 
In the STREST methodology, the “level of detail and sophistication” used for the risk 
computation reflects the level of complexity of the methods adopted for the component 
and system-level risk assessment. In a general sense, it may be defined as the trueness 
and precision, and the repeatability and reproducibility of the results of the risk 
assessment.  
The selection of the “level of detail and sophistication” to be used in a particular stress 
test, namely, to perform the hazard and risk analysis, is important because it allows 
defining how reliable are the results of the Assessment phase of the stress test. At the 
same time, this is a challenge, since it requires experts that need to have a clear idea 
about all of the models and methods available in the scientific literature to perform each 
step of the analysis, i.e. the “center, body and range” of the methods and models. The 
state-of-the-practice methods and models are expected to have the trueness, precision, 
repeatability and reproducibility that can be achieved within the established state of 
knowledge and within a reasonable engineering and analysis effort. The experts need to 
characterize the trueness and precision of the state-of-practice methods using 
multiplicative factors (to shift the mean and adjust trueness) and dispersions (to 
characterize the precision). More advanced methods should be promoted and less 
advanced methods should be discouraged by adjusting the factors used to characterize 
them. Thus, a penalty system is proposed as a part of the ST@STREST methodology.  
During the Pre- Assessment Phase (STEP 3: Set-up of the Stress Test) the TI and PM select 
the most appropriate ST-Level for the given CI. As each ST-Level corresponds to a different 
level of complexity of the hazard and risk analysis, a different level of “detail and 
sophistication” should be required as a minimum to perform the required analysis. 
In particular, in the proposed ST@STREST, a Target Level (TL) of “detail and 
sophistication”, has been associated with each ST-Level, according to the judgement about 
the complexity of the required hazard and risk analysis. This target value represents the 
state of knowledge of the community and characterizes the state-of-practice of assessing 
the CI at the component and the system level.  
Then, data, models and methods needed to perform each step of the risk analysis are 
identified by the TI. These models and methods are characterized by a level of detail that 
reflects the grade of complexity among the wide range of available methods in the 
scientific literature. The level of “detail and sophistication” of the Stress Test depends on 
the specific models selected for the particular test. This selection is mainly based on a 
scientific ground, but also has practical consequences, such as the requirement of the 
necessary duration and resources for the stress test. Therefore, the choice of the models 
should be taken (and documented) jointly by the TI and the PM. Based on the choices 
made, the TI evaluates the Effective Level of detail of the analysis (EL). This assessment 
is reviewed by the Internal Review (IR) team, and compared with the TL. The EL should 
be at least as high as the TL. Based on the IR review, PM and TI may evaluate if changes 
to the hazard and risk analysis complexity are needed, principally to avoid potential 
penalties suggested by the reviewers. In fact, if the EL attained in the conducted stress 
test is lower than the TL required, the ST@STREST Penalty System is applied. 
In the following, the ST@STREST Penalty System, based on the difference between the EL 
and the TL, is proposed. 
2.6.1 Proposed penalty system 
The proposed ST@STREST Penalty System aims to penalize the results of the hazard and 
risk assessment of the conducted stress test by evaluating a Penalty Factor (PF). This 
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factor penalizes simplistic approaches (with respect to the state-of-practice) that cannot 
guarantee a sufficiently accurate analysis. 
The PF is defined by the TI in STEP 6 (Risk Objectives Check) of the methodology based 
on the difference between EL and TL. Namely, if the EL is greater or equal to TL the penalty 
system is not applied.  
Levels of “detail and sophistication” and a Penalty Factor scheme are proposed in the 
following. This is just one of the possible schemes that the PM and TI need to determine, 
the IR to review and confirm, with a possibility to involve the PoE to arrive at the broadest 
possible consensus. However, the proposed Levels and Penalty Factor system is general 
and can be applied in stress test.  
Proposed levels 
Three categories are defined to describe the trueness, precision, repeatability and 
reproducibility of the hazard and risk analysis in a stress test: 
o Advanced: making use of detailed information and advanced state-of-the-art 
methods and models in most of the steps of the assessment;  
o High: making use of commonly detailed information and state-of-the-practice 
methods and models in most of the steps of the assessment;  
o Moderate: making use of coarse information and simplified methods in most of the 
steps of the assessment.  
Starting from this classification, a Target Level has been associated to each ST-Level 
(Table 2.8) according to the grade of complexity of the risk analysis required. In case a 
quantitative scale is adopted, a Factor interval (  0,1F ) is set up by the experts and 
associated to each Level. An example is provided in the following:  
1. Advanced :  0.7,1F  
2. High :  0.4,0.7F  
3. Moderate:  0.2,0.4F  
These values associated to each level are indicative: in a particular stress test, they need 
to be determined by consensus between the PM, TI and IR. In general, these values can 
be studied in more detail, for example, in a study to account for different parameters that 
affect the results of stress tests. In this case, the resulting Effective Level identified for 
the hazard and risk assessment, i.e. the EL, should be at least equal to the lowest F (lower 
bound of the interval) corresponding to the Target Level. In this case the TL is 
characterized by lower  
lb
TL  and upper  
ub
TL bounds. 
Table 2.8  Target Levels for each ST-Level 
ST-Level Target Level (TL) 
1a Moderate 
2a Moderate 
2b High 
2c Advanced 
2d Advanced 
3c Advanced 
3d Advanced 
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Effective level (EL) 
At component-level (ST-L1) there are three methods to perform the single-hazard 
component check. These methods differ in the complexity and the data needed for the 
computation. Therefore, the associated ”level of detail and sophistication” is set as follows: 
o Hazard-based assessment: Moderate 
o Design-based assessment: High 
o Risk-based assessment: Moderate to Advanced  
The Effective Level for the component hazard-based and design-based assessments is 
moderate (lowest of all possible) and high, respectively. This means that, according to 
Table 2.8, the hazard-based assessment represents the minimum level of analysis 
required.  
If a risk-based component assessment approach is required, the Effective Level may vary 
according to the level of trueness, precision, repeatability and reproducibility used for the 
evaluation of hazard and vulnerability. Therefore, the resulting EL is a function of the 
trueness, precision, repeatability and reproducibility of the method adopted for hazard and 
vulnerability analysis and it may vary from Moderate to Advanced.  
For system–level (ST-L2 or ST-L3) stress tests, the evaluation of EL is a function of the 
level of detail selected for each hazard, the method adopted for the epistemic uncertainty 
quantification, and the method adopted for the multi-hazard/risk evaluation. Furthermore, 
evaluation of EL for each hazard is a function of the level of each step and sub-step needed 
for the computation of the performance and risk of the CI. In other words, if the 
computation of risk comprises three principal steps i (hazard, vulnerability and risk), and 
each one of the steps is characterized by j different layers, the resulting EL is a function 
of the level of “detail and sophistication” of each step i and layer j. Thus, if a qualitative 
scale is adopted, the EL corresponds to the most frequent (mode) value of the level of 
detail adopted in each step and layer. If a quantitative scale is adopted (i.e. a quantitative 
factor is associated with the analysis), the EL may be computed (for a single hazard 
analysis, ST-L2) following Eq. (2.6):   
1, 2, 3,1, 2, 3,
1 1 1
1 2 3
j j j
pn m
j j j
j j j
w EL w EL w EL
EL W W W
n m p
  
  
  
                    (2.6) 
where n, m and p are the number of layers in each step (hazard, vulnerability, risk); 
iW  
represent the weight of each step i of the risk analysis and ,i jw  the weight of each layer j 
(for each step i) set up by experts. If all layers (for each step) are considered equally 
important, then
1,1 1,2 1,n.... 1w w w    2,1 2,2 2,m.... 1w w w    , 3,1 3,2 3,p.... 1w w w    . If all 
steps are considered equally important, then 
1 2 3 1 3W W W   . 
In case of a multi-hazard analysis (ST-L3), ALE may be obtained as in Eq. (2.7): 
11 2
1 2 ....
sHH H
sH EL H EL H ELEL
s
  
                       (2.7) 
where 
qH  represents a weight of each hazard q set up by experts. Thus, a multi-hazard 
EL corresponds to the weighted mean of the level of detail evaluated for each hazard ELHq. 
If all hazards are considered equally important, then the weights 
1 2 ... 1sH H H    . If 
the epistemic uncertainty analysis is also of concern, the method of accounting for 
epistemic uncertainties could be considered as an additional layer. 
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Penalty factor (PF) 
The penalty factor (PF) is defined as the difference between the EL and the TL of the ST 
level selected. If a qualitative scale (i.e. Moderate, High, Advanced) is considered, three 
cases are possible: 
a) TL=High, EL =Moderate 
b) TL =Advanced, EL = High 
c) TL= Advanced, EL =Moderate 
 
The penalty factor may be computed using the reference values that may be associated 
to the three cases.  
For example, in the cases above: a) PFH-M=0.2, b) PFA-H=0.2, c) PFA-M=0.4. These values 
are indicative: the actual values need to be set by experts’ consensus for each stress test.  
If the “level of detail and sophistication” is expressed using a quantitative scale, PF is 
defined as the difference between the EL and the lower bound of the TL of the ST level 
selected  
lb
STTL , 
 
0
lb
STPF TL EL
otherwise
  


 lb
STif EL TL
                  (2.8) 
        
Note that the penalty system could be also applied to penalize the CIs that reach the 
minimum target but just barely, i.e. when
lb ub
ST STTL EL TL  . In this case, the PF may be 
evaluated considering the upper bound of the TL, i.e., 
 
ub
STPF TL EL                        (2.9) 
Penalized loss, LP 
Consider that the outcome of the risk assessment at the system level is expressed by the 
annual exceedance rate of losses (L),  l . For example, in case seismic hazard is of 
concern, according to the PEER performance based earthquake engineering (PBEE) 
framework (Cornel and Krawinkler, 2000),  l is formulated as: 
         | | |
d edp im
l G l d dG d edp dG edp im d im              (2.10) 
where im is an intensity measure (e.g., peak ground acceleration, peak ground velocity, 
spectral acceleration, etc.), edp is an engineering demand parameter (e.g., interstorey 
drift), d is a damage measure (e.g., minor, medium extensive, etc.), l is the loss variable 
(e.g., monetary losses, down-town time, etc.), and  y | xG  is a conditional 
complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) relating the variables.  
As mentioned before, the risk analysis can be performed at different levels of “detail and 
sophistication”. In Eq. 2.9 it is possible to include an extra uncertainty, here named penalty 
uncertainty, to penalize simplistic analysis approaches. Therefore, a new metric is 
introduced, named penalized loss LP expressed (in the logarithmic scale) as: 
   log logP PL L                (2.11) 
where 𝜀𝑃 is the penalty uncertainty. Observe that penalty uncertainty 𝜀𝑃 acts exactly as 
model error. In fact, the objective is to amplify the uncertainties introduced by simplistic 
approaches that cannot guarantee an analysis with desirable level of “detail and 
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sophistication”. A convenient choice for the probability distribution of 𝜀𝑃 is the Normal 
distribution, i.e. 𝜀𝑃~𝑁(0, 𝜎(𝑙)), where  l  is defined as: 
   log , 0l PF l l                 (2.12) 
where PF is the penalty factor defined previously. Observe that PF acts as a coefficient of 
variation (c.o.v). Further, in order to focus on the tails of the risk curve, no error is added 
to the penalty factor for 0l  . 
Considering that the support of 𝐿 is usually  0,  or bounded as  max0,l  , the distribution 
of 
P must be truncated according to the support of L. It is of interest to observe that  l  
is proportional to the loss; consequently, the tails are penalized both by the presence of 
an extra-uncertainty and by a higher  l . 
Then, the penalized loss LP is a new random variable, defined conditionally with respect to 
the loss value l obtained from the risk assessment. Given this, the conditional cumulative 
complementary distribution of LP can be written as: 
     | 1 | |P P P PG l l F l l P L l L l                (2.13) 
and the annual exceedance rate of LP can be written as: 
     |P P
l
l G l l d l                 (2.14) 
An example is provided in Fig. 2.14, where the annual exceedance curve of a hypothetical 
CI has been penalized using different PF values. The blue curve corresponds to PF=0, i.e. 
the annual exceedance rate of L (Eq. 2.9), while the other curves represent the annual 
exceedance rate of the penalized loss LP expressed in Eq. 2.13.  
 
Fig. 2.14  Annual exceedance curves of penalized loss considering different penalty 
factor values 
Discussion 
There are some points of the penalty system that need further discussion and 
investigations as a part of future studies. 
Firstly, the proposed penalty system requires levels of “detail and sophistication” 
(qualitative and/or quantitative) to be properly set by experts’ consensus. Experts must 
have a clear idea about models and methods available in the scientific literature and their 
applicability to perform each step of the risk analysis. This may not be feasible for all perils 
that have to be considered for the stress test. Further, this evaluation should change in 
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each stress test, reflecting the progress of the scientific research. The level of knowledge 
between two stress tests may change and the levels of “detail and sophistication” scheme 
should reflect this change. 
Secondly, the computation of the Effective Level (Eq. 2.5 and 2.6) does not take into 
account the level of “detail and sophistication “associated to the approach adopted for the 
multi-risk analysis. This is because the current level of knowledge does not allow ranking 
these approaches, even though different multi-risk methods have been proposed recently.  
Finally, the distribution of the penalized loss has been selected as a Lognormal distribution 
in this project. Other probability distributions, for example, a Gaussian distribution on the 
normal scale can be justified as well. Further studies on the determination of the 
appropriate distribution of the penalized loss should be done. 
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3. Incorporating ST@STREST into the life cycle management 
of non-nuclear critical CIs 
3.1 Introduction 
Structures and civil infrastructure systems are subjected to time-varying environmental 
stressors. These stressors can be low-consequence persistent stressors such as aging, 
fatigue or corrosion, as well as high-consequence low-probability-of-occurrence stressors 
such as natural or man-made disastrous events. Both types of stressors may induce huge 
economic losses and result in significant environmental impacts on the community these 
CI systems serve. In order to increase the long-term performance of such systems against 
rare events and long-term degradation process, it is very important to implement 
adequate strategies for maintaining such systems during their lifetimes. 
These activities may include periodic inspections, maintenance and retrofit actions, 
structural health monitoring, and performance and risk analysis (Frangopol and Soliman, 
2016). These actions are rationally scheduled along the life-cycle of the systems using a 
life-cycle management (LCM) procedure. Life cycle cost (LCC) and optimization tools are 
usually adopted to predict the performance of an infrastructure system subjected to long-
term degradation process during its lifetime and to plan maintenance interventions. In 
particular, the performance profile (performance indicator graphed against time) resulting 
from the life cycle analysis allows planning the necessary interventions (maintenance, 
inspection and repair) in order to maintain the structural performance at an acceptable 
level. Establishing the best schedules requires a robust optimization process. The 
complexity of this process depends on the scale of the problem and on the type of 
deterioration phenomena considered (long-term processes and/or extraordinary events). 
A brief overview of different aspects of LCM (i.e. life cycle analysis and cost optimization, 
degradation processes and modelling as well as the role of structural health monitoring 
and inspection techniques in supporting life cycle management decisions) may be found 
in STREST Deliverable 5.3 (Esposito and Stojadinovic 2016b). 
3.2 LCC including natural hazard risk 
The main aim of a LCC is to predict the performance of a CI system subjected to all 
environmental stressors during its lifetime. However, it is noted that the seismic risk 
analysis, and natural hazard risk analysis in general, has not devoted enough attention to 
the structural maintenance optimization problem (Furuta et al, 2011), although some 
examples exist. In regions exposed to frequent catastrophic natural events, LCC 
optimization analysis should account for the effects of these hazards. The model proposed 
by Chang and Shinozuka (1996) represents one of the first attempts to include natural 
hazard (in particular seismic risk) in the LCC framework. The framework is shown in Fig. 
3.1. It includes two innovative aspects: 
i. First, in addition to the initial costs of construction and costs attributed to maintenance 
action, the costs due to service interruption are considered. The latter are called “user 
costs” that represent the societal costs that are imposed when the functionality of a 
system is reduced mostly during the routine maintenance work or the retrofit action. 
For example, during a maintenance intervention of a bridge, the serviceability of the 
road network (flow of goods and people) is reduced, imposing an increment of travel 
time for each user. The total extra travel cost due to the maintenance action 
represents the user cost.  
ii. Second, the expected costs associated to seismic risk of a CI system (i.e. discount 
cost for seismic retrofit and damage/repair costs) during the lifecycle of a structure or 
a system are combined with the initial capital and discounted maintenance cost. 
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Fig. 3.1  Life-Cycle Cost framework including natural hazard risks adapted from Chang 
and Shinozuka (1996) 
The life-cycle costs C is divided in four categories as expressed in the following equation: 
1 2 3 4C C C C C     (3.1) 
where 
1C  and 2C represents the planned costs, 3C  and 4C  the unplanned costs. 
Planned costs to owners (
1C ) involves initial construction, subsequent expected discounted 
maintenance costs and discounted seismic retrofit costs, considering that a seismic retrofit 
is only applied once in the lifetime of a structure. In addition to planned costs paid by the 
owner of the structure/infrastructure system, maintenance and seismic retrofit actions 
may also impose user costs (
2C ) due to the interruption of normal service (e.g. travel 
delay in a road network). This cost imposed to the society is function of the extent and 
the duration of the usage disruption during the maintenance activities and the retrofit 
action.  
In addition to the costs associated to maintenance and design choices (planned costs), the 
framework includes unplanned life cycle costs related to the structural performance and 
associated repair costs due to a seismic event. Unplanned costs to owners (
3C ) consist of 
expected discounted repair costs of earthquake damage over the life span of the structure. 
These costs are evaluated performing a probabilistic seismic risk/performance analysis of 
the system, conditional to its physical state at time t. The performance evaluation changes 
over time due to natural deterioration as well as mitigation actions. The unplanned hazard-
related user costs (
4C ) constitute the final category of this life-cycle cost framework and 
they are also based on a probabilistic condition/performance analysis of the system under 
study. These user costs are related to the service disruption due to earthquake damage 
and repairs and depend on the expected duration of repair/reconstruction activity over the 
life span of the structure.  
3.3 Unified life cycle management of CI 
Through the life cycle of the CI, systems operators have the objective to maintain the 
infrastructure systems and mitigate degradation of system components over time all the 
while achieving an economically justified operation of the system. To this aim, LCC and 
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optimization tools are usually adopted to predict the performance of an infrastructure 
subjected to long-term degradation process during its lifetime and planning maintenance 
interventions. However, in regions exposed to natural events, LCC analysis should also 
take into account the effects of extreme natural events that may increase the probability 
of failure or loss of functionality during their lifetime. 
The multi-level framework ST@STREST has been proposed with the aim of providing a 
multi-level systematic and harmonized approach for the evaluation of the performance of 
these systems against extreme and disastrous natural events.  
In order to increase and optimize the long-term performance of CIs, the outcomes and 
findings of a stress test (e.g. results of risk analysis and identified risk mitigation 
strategies) should be included in the long-term maintenance plan of a CI. Results of the 
risk analysis (i.e. Assessment phase, Phase 2) in terms of system performance and 
expected costs of natural events may be incorporated in a LCC analysis and optimization 
problem. Furthermore, the evaluation of risk reduction strategies (Decision Phase) may 
make it possible to reconsider the full management and maintenance plan of the CI itself. 
Therefore, the possibility to include the data on the current state of a CI in the aftermath 
of an actual disastrous event is another important aspect of the proposed framework. The 
state of civil infrastructures after the occurrence of a natural event is usually assessed 
through rapid visual inspection or automatic screening tools (e.g. close-circuit television). 
Through the use of standardized survey forms (e.g. EERI, 1996), data on the typology, 
location, component’s features and the assessed physical damages are then collected to 
provide an estimate of the extent of the service disruption, costs and repair times and to 
define the repair/replacement strategy to apply. At the same time, the processing of these 
data can be useful to update the state condition history of the inspected components of 
the CI and for estimating and/or updating of the performance prediction models used in 
the risk analysis.  
In this section, a framework to integrate stress test outcomes and findings and data 
gathered from post-event damage survey into a unified life-cycle management strategy is 
proposed and discussed. In particular, an extended version of the model proposed by 
Chang and Shinozuka (1996) is proposed. The proposed framework aims to include the 
stress test outcomes (i.e. loss curves, safety assessment and risk mitigation strategies) 
and information that can be retrieved from post-event damage survey into a life cycle cost 
evaluation and optimization procedure. 
3.3.1 Life cycle analysis including stress test and post-event data 
In order to optimize the life-cycle costs in a CI management strategy, the outputs of a 
stress test are going to be considered in the proposed framework.  
As shown in Fig. 3.2, the outcomes of a Stress Test have an impact on: 
o Expected damages: unplanned life cycle costs related to the structural performance 
and associated repair costs due to extreme natural events. A stress test allows to 
evaluate the performance of the CI against extreme natural events (according to 
the ST-Level adopted). In this way it is possible to quantify the expected costs 
caused by extreme natural events and then evaluate the associated unplanned 
owner and user costs ( 3C  and 4C  in equation 3.1) to be included in the LCC analysis 
and optimization. 
o Mitigation history: another outcome of a stress test is represented by the evaluation 
of risk reduction strategies based on a disaggregation analysis (Decision Phase, 
Phase 3). A disaggregation analysis is aimed at obtaining the probability that a 
specific value of a variable involved in the risk assessment is causative for the 
exceedance of a loss value of interest. The loss may be disaggregated with respect 
to system’s response, which may help identifying the component the damage of 
which most likely causes the exceedance of the loss value of interest. Then, risk 
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mitigation strategies are formulated based on the results of the disaggregation 
analysis with the aim of increasing the long-term performance of CIs. 
 
Fig. 3.2  Proposed framework for assimilating stress test and post-event data in a total 
life cycle cost analysis 
In order to demonstrate how the outputs of a stress test may be incorporated in the life 
cycle management of a CI, the proposed framework was applied to the case study of 
L’Aquila (Italy) gas network. A Stress Test Level 2a was performed on the L’Aquila network 
as it was before the 2009 earthquake event to assess the performance of the network due 
to earthquake hazard. Risk is expressed in terms of annual probability of exceedance of 
service disruption levels, measured by a connectivity-based performance indicator (PI), 
i.e. the Connectivity Loss CL. Risk boundaries for the case study were defined in terms of 
F-N limits, according to the equation reported in STERST Deliverable 5.1 (Esposito et al 
2016). Then, a disaggregation analysis was performed and possible risk mitigation 
strategies were identified. Finally, in order to evaluate the consequences of the risk 
reduction actions (e.g. seismic retrofit of some components of the gas network), the 
seismic performance of the gas network was assessed again, and results of the risk 
analysis were compared with the risk objectives identified at the beginning of the stress 
test.  
Results in terms of annual exceedance curve of the assessed performance loss considering 
three mitigation actions are shown in Fig. 3.3.  
More details on this application study are presented in STREST Deliverable 5.3 (Esposito 
and Stojadinovic 2016b).  
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Fig. 3.3  Annual rate of exceedance of CL considering mitigation strategies applied to the 
stations (MS1 and MS2) and to buried pipelines (MS3) 
Another important aspect of the proposed framework is represented by the use of collected 
data on the state of a CI in the aftermath of a disastrous event. As shown in Fig. 3.2, the 
information gathered for post-event inspection and survey has an impact on: 
o Condition history: after a disastrous even, new information about the CI is available. 
Through the collection and the processing of on-site data the state condition of the 
inspected components of the CI may be updated.  
o Risk analysis: information gathered after the occurrence of a natural disaster can 
be used to estimate and/or update performance model parameters adopted in the 
risk analysis through the use of statistical regression methods or the more advanced 
Bayesian approaches. 
o Mitigation history: the main purpose of post-event damage surveys is to assess the 
functionality of system’s components and the repair/replacement strategy to apply. 
o Maintenance costs: the updated state condition of the CI may be used to redefine 
the intervention maintenance schedule, i.e. to determine whether a maintenance 
action is needed or not. 
Information gathered after the occurrence of a natural disaster can be of extraordinary 
importance for the estimation and/or updating of performance prediction models adopted 
in the risk analysis. Through the gathering and the processing of the post event damage 
data, it is possible to derive empirical estimate of performance models (Basoz et al, 1999, 
Shinozuka et al, 2000; O’Rourke and So, 2000). 
Statistical regression methods or more advanced Bayesian approaches can be used to 
estimate model parameters. In particular, Bayesian procedures are adopted to update 
model parameters estimates when new data becomes available, combining the likelihood 
function with the prior information on these parameters (Straub and Der Kiureghian, 
2008). This approach has also the ability to handle all types of information and to include 
engineering expert opinion through a prior distribution. 
An example of empirical estimation and Bayesian updating of a fragility model for buried 
pipelines is provided in STREST Deliverable 5.3 (Esposito and Stojadinovic 2016b). Pipeline 
damage data retrieved after the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake were used to estimate a fragility 
function for buried steel pipes caused by seismic ground shaking. In particular, a Bayesian 
estimation model along with the use of Importance sampling technique for numerical 
efficiency has been adopted to estimate the parameters of the fragility function considering 
as a-priori distribution of the model parameters a non-informative one. Fig. 3.4 shows the 
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results of the Bayesian estimation for all sets of simulations. The results of the estimations 
were compared with a pipeline fragility relation considered suitable (in terms of pipe 
material and diameter) for the L’Aquila gas network., i.e. the ALA (2001) for steel arc 
welded pipes. 
 
Fig. 3.4  Comparison of existing and updated fragility curves for L’Aquila gas steel pipes 
This case study shows that valuable data from the model-based stress tests and actual 
post-event investigations can be inserted into a total life cycle cost analysis and that the 
effects of high-consequence low-probability events can be combined with the effects of 
low-consequence persistent degradation processes in a comprehensive model to better 
plan the life-cycle management of critical civil infrastructure systems. 
3.4 Discussions 
In regions exposed to natural events, LCC analysis should also take into account the effects 
of extreme natural events that may increase the probability of failure or loss of 
functionality during their lifetime. However, very few studies have been focused on the 
possibility to include the risk associated to extreme natural events in a LCCframework.  
Stress tests for civil infrastructure systems have been proposed in with the aim of 
providing a multi-level systematic and harmonized approach for the evaluation of the 
performance of these systems against extreme and disastrous natural events. In 
particular, the ST@STERST multi-level framework has been proposed to verify the risk of 
CI systems respect to extreme natural events and to support decision makers in the 
evaluation of strategies to improve the performance of CIs along the life cycle. Each Stress 
Test Level is characterized by different objectives (component or system) and by different 
levels of risk analysis complexity (starting from design codes and ending with state-of-
the-art risk analyses, such as modeling cascading failures). This makes the stress test 
adaptable to different hazard contexts and application to a broad range of civil 
infrastructure systems. Further, the level of complexity is tuned accordingly to types of 
critical infrastructures, the potential consequence of failure of the CIs, the types of 
hazards, and the available resources for conducting the stress tests. 
A possible framework to integrate the results of stress tests and the data retrieved after 
disastrous events into a unified life-cycle management strategy of CIs has been introduced 
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in order to manage both long degradation and instantaneous natural hazard-induced 
stresses during the lifetime of a civil infrastructure system. 
In particular, results of the risk analysis conducted in the scope of a stress test in terms 
of system performance and expected costs of natural events, may be incorporated in a 
LCC analysis and optimization problem. Further, the evaluation of risk reduction strategies 
resulting from a loss disaggregation may make it possible to reconsider the full 
management and maintenance plan of the CI itself. 
On the other hand, the evaluation of the state of civil infrastructures after the occurrence 
of a natural event, and the collection and processing of post-event data, such as typology, 
location, component’s features and the assessed physical damages, can be useful to 
update the state condition history of the inspected components of the CI and to estimate 
and/or update performance prediction models used in the risk analysis. 
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4. Using ST@STREST to enhance societal resilience 
When CIs are affected by extreme natural events, such as earthquakes, floods, tsunami, 
etc., they are more and more often unable to quickly recover their functionality, either 
back to the pre-disaster original state, or just to a level sufficient to satisfy the post-
disaster demand. With the increasing density and interconnectedness of the communities 
today, the demand on and the importance of the CIs is growing; thus, the consequences 
of CI failure (to meet the demands) can be devastating both from the standpoint of human 
life endangerment and from the economic standpoint. The post-disaster performance of 
CIs has a high impact on the coordination and the execution of emergency actions, and at 
the same time it influences both the long-lasting post-disaster recovery process of the 
community, and the eventual post-disaster resumption of community functions.  
Today, after decades of development of probabilistic risk assessment techniques, there 
are solid probabilistic engineering risk assessment methods and tools that provide practical 
estimates of instantaneous CI performance (service) loss due to direct and indirect 
disaster-induced damage. However, the instantaneous loss by itself does not reveal how 
a community served by the CIs responds to a disaster. The time dimension represents a 
key aspect: the time-evolution of community needs and the ability of the CIs to fulfill these 
needs (e.g. water, gas, and electricity) is best represented and modelled using the concept 
of resilience rather than of risk.  
The term resilience has increasingly been seen in the research literature in many fields, 
from psychology, biology, economy, social studies, and also engineering. Definition and 
modelling or disaster resilience of engineered systems is the topic of an increasing amount 
of recent research work. Nevertheless, there is still a substantial diversity among the 
definitions and the modelling of resilience. In this project, we will define resilience in 
general as “the ability (of CIs and communities) to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover 
from and more successfully adapt to adverse events” (The National Academy 2012). 
Conducting a stress test to assess only the risk of a civil infrastructure system, i.e. to 
relate the losses with the total probability of their occurrence due to one or more hazards, 
does not provide enough information on the ability of the CI system to function and recover 
after a disaster. The system, and systems of systems that form the built environment of 
our society, are non-linear.  
The ST@STREST framework proposed in Chapter 2 aims at evaluating the CI system risk 
from natural hazards. However, this framework was designed to also serve as a basis for 
the development of a new stress test concept that may support decision makers in the 
evaluation of strategies to not only decrease the risk exposure, but also to enhance the 
resilience of CIs against natural hazards.  
It is clear that a new resilience-oriented stress test methodology and framework for civil 
infrastructure systems must include the recovery process and, furthermore, include 
models of how the systems function and deliver their service to the community, and how 
the community recovers its needs for such services. The ST@STREST framework was 
developed while keeping in mind such an extension, to make it possible to test the 
resilience of CIs to extreme events, i.e. to verify the capacity of CIs to anticipate, absorb 
and adapt to events disruptive to its function, and recover either back to its original state 
or another state consistent with the needs of the community during, and at the end of the 
post-disaster recovery process. 
The extension of the proposed framework requires the pursuit of two main goals: 
o Identification of resilience metrics and standardized methodologies to model the 
resilience of CIs; and 
o Understanding how stakeholders’ needs depend on CIs, defining resilience-based 
acceptance criteria. 
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Regarding the identification of resilience-based acceptance criteria, understanding how the 
different stakeholders’ needs depend on the functionality of the CIs represents the key 
issue. Business activities need suitable facilities and their supply chains and delivery 
networks; everyone needs a transportation network, electricity, water, gas, and 
communication networks but, in the aftermath of a disastrous event, some of these 
services (e.g. water) are more needed than others. There are also different, and competing 
priorities for services to critical facilities (e.g. hospitals). Reconciling these factors to 
develop CI resilience acceptance criteria, taking into account not only the instantaneous 
losses but also the time evolution of the CIs and the community systems during the 
recovery process, is not trivial.  
In this chapter these aspects will be argued in more details. A detailed overview of a 
possible approach to integrate the evolution of the CI performance in time in the 
ST@STREST framework is presented in STREST Deliverable 5.4 (Esposito and Stojadinovic 
2016c) and STREST Deliverable 4.5 (Stojadinovic and Esposito 2016). 
4.1 Modelling resilience of critical infrastructures against natural 
hazards 
The probabilistic resilience assessment of CIs is gaining increasing importance in a 
research effort toward assessing the risk and resilience of communities to natural hazards 
because the CIs are essential to the functioning of a community.  
Several definitions of resilience have been offered in various disciplines. Many of them are 
similar and they overlap with existing concepts as robustness, flexibility, agility, etc. The 
concept of resilience has been also approached across application domains, including 
psychology, ecology, enterprises, and engineering, among others. In the engineering 
domain, in particular in the subdomain of infrastructure systems, the National 
Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC, 2009) defined the resilience of infrastructure 
systems as “the ability to predict, absorb, adapt and/or quickly recover from a disruptive 
event such as natural disasters”. Infrastructure systems are also considered as subdomain 
of social science, in which lack of CI resilience can lead to huge consequences on 
communities. 
In the civil infrastructure domain, in a field-defining paper, Bruneau et al (2003) 
conceptualized the resilience as a metric that “can be understood as the ability of the 
system to reduce the chances of a shock, to absorb a shock if it occurs, and to recover 
quickly after a shock”. The authors defined four dimensions of resilience in the well-known 
resilience triangle model: 1) robustness, the strength of the system, 2) rapidity, i.e. the 
speed at which the system could return to its original state or at an acceptable level of 
functionality, 3) resourcefulness, the level of capability in applying material and human 
resources to respond to a disruptive event, and 4) redundancy, the extent to which carries 
by a system to minimize the likelihood and the impact of disruption.  
Bruneau et al (2003) proposed a deterministic static metric of the resilience loss of a 
community with respect to a specific event, as the expected degradation in quality 
(probability of failure), over time (that is, time to recovery), R, formulated in the following 
equation. 
 
1
0
100
t
t
R Q t dt                                                                  (4.1) 
where Q(T) represents the quality of the system, t0 the time when the specific damaging 
event occurs and t1 is the time when the restoration of the system is completed (indicated 
by a quality of 100%). The notion of system quality was left open to interpretation, but is 
often understood as the ability of the system to perform, which, in the case of CIs, may 
mean the quantity of delivered service.  
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Following the Bruneau et al (2003) pioneering study, considerable attention has been 
focused towards developing frameworks to assess the resilience of civil facilities or 
infrastructures; among these, notable works are: Chang and Shinouzuka (2004), Franchin 
and Cavalieri (2015), Bocchini et al (2014), Francis and Bekera, (2014), Broccardo et al 
(2015), Iervolino and Giorgio (2015), Sun et al (2015a,b).   
Among them, the most innovative are Francis and Bekera, (2014) and Broccardo et al 
(2015) 
Francis and Bekera (2014) proposed a resilience factor as quantitative metric of an 
infrastructure system’s resilience. This factor depends on a speed recovery factor, the 
original stable system performance level (pre-disaster performance of the system), the 
performance level immediately post-disruption (before recovery starts), and the 
performance at a new stable state level (after recovery efforts have been exhausted). The 
speed recovery factor is defined as a function of the time that is acceptable to elapse after 
a disaster before recovery starts, the time to complete initial recovery actions and the 
time to final recovery. 
Broccardo et al (2015) investigated all the statistical assumptions and limitations to 
integrate the quantification of seismic resilience of a given civil facility or system in a 
stochastic Markovian framework. In particular, the study revisited the PEER framework 
formula by imposing the resilience of a facility as a final decision variable, analyzing then 
the limitations and the range of applicability evaluating the probability of interaction 
between the recovery time and the inter-arrival time of seismic events.  
However, despite the increasing importance of the role of system resilience in various 
disciplines of system engineering, and the recent efforts by many authors, there is a 
substantial diversity among the definitions and the modelling of resilience (Hosseini et al, 
2016, Henry and Ramirez-Marquez, 2012, Ouyang and Duenas-Osorio 2012, Bruneau et 
al, 2003).  
As also reported by Bruneau et al (2003) "there is no explicit set of procedures that 
suggests how to quantify resilience in the context of earthquake hazard, how to compare 
communities with one another in terms of resilience, or how to determine whether 
individual communities are moving in the direction of becoming more resilient in the face 
of earthquake hazards."  
Communities and infrastructure systems are complex systems of systems. Modelling their 
resilience against natural hazards in a probabilistic way and with a single metric is not 
quite straightforward. Further, most of the resilience quantification frameworks proposed 
in literature impose the point of view of the infrastructure owner, i.e. to recover the initial 
functionality of the system as fast as possible. However, CIs are built to deliver a service 
to a community, then the resilience assessment should also take into account the ability 
of a CI to supply the time-varying community demand for the services provided by the 
assessed CI (Mieler et al, 2015). A CI resilience quantification framework needs to 
explicitly account for the evolution of the supply (i.e. the service supply capacity of the 
system) and for the evolution of the demand of the community and other CIs for its 
services in the aftermath of a disaster. 
To this end, a compositional demand/supply resilience quantification framework to 
evaluate the post-disaster resilience of CISs that supply their services to satisfy the 
demand of a community was recently proposed (Dider et al, 2015; Sun et al 2015a, 2015b; 
Didier et al, in prep). The framework accounts explicitly for the evolution of the demand 
of a community and the demand of other CIs during the post-disaster recovery process. 
The framework consists of three main elements: 
1. The evolution of the potential demand for the service of the investigated CI over 
time after a disaster. The potential demand is the amount of demand of all 
consumers of the service of the assessed CI, if there were no limitations on the 
supply side (i.e. assuming an unlimited supply of service). Consumers include, for 
example, the community (composed by its residential building stock, industries, 
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businesses and critical facilities, used by the population) and all other CIs (e.g. 
electric power demand of the water supply system in order to run water pumps). 
Potential demand depends on: 
o the vulnerability of the components of the set of demand systems (e.g. a 
community and/or another CI) during the loss accumulation and absorption 
phase of a disaster; and, 
o the recovery of the components of the set of demand systems during the 
recovery phase after a disaster. 
o potential extraordinary or high-priority needs in the aftermath of a disaster (e.g. 
hospital, telecommunications networks) 
2. The evolution of the potential supply for the service of the investigated CI over time 
after a disaster. The potential supply is the amount of service supply available to 
satisfy the demand of the system. Potential supply depends on:  
o the vulnerability of the components of the service supply and distribution 
systems during the loss accumulation and absorption phase of a disaster; and 
o the recovery of the components of the service supply and distribution systems 
during the recovery phase after a disaster. 
3. A system operation model, regulating the allocation (or dispatch) of the service 
supply in order to satisfy the demand of the consumers. It accounts for the capacity 
limitations and interactions of the different elements of the CI: the service 
production system, the distribution system, the technical functioning and control of 
the system, and the system or network effects. These include, for example, the 
topology of the system, operator service allocation policies, or possible demand 
distribution strategies. 
The compositional resilience quantification framework allows for the assessment of the 
resilience of a combined, interacting set of demand/supply CI systems. CI system 
resilience is the time-varying ability to cover the demand for its services, while subjected 
to disruptive events that may occur over the system’s lifetime. The framework allows, 
thus, to account for the impact of a disaster on both the demand and the supply side and 
to track the post-disaster evolution of demand and supply at both component and system 
levels. The evolution of the demand, supply and consumption after a disaster is sketched 
in Fig. 4.1. The shaded area represents the integral lack of resilience, i.e. the time during 
which the demand of the community is larger than the service provided by the CI. Also 
shown are the measures of time required to satisfy the demand, and times needed to fully 
recover the demand and the supply to the pre-disaster level, accounting for some reserve 
margin.  
One advantage of the proposed compositional resilience quantification framework is the 
component and system level evaluation strategy, which follows the ST@STREST 
methodology. Another advantage is the explicit account of the evolution of demand, supply 
and consumption of a CI service. This makes it possible to treat event sequences, such as 
aftershocks, community depopulation, such as the aftermath of the 72 AD Pompeii volcanic 
eruption, permanent demand changes, such as the effect of the 1995 Kobe earthquake on 
the recovery of Kobe port operations or the effect of demand surges, such as those that 
occur on the cellular phone network immediately after a disaster.  
A detailed overview of this framework is presented in STREST deliverable 4.5 (Stojadinovic 
and Esposito, 2016). 
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Fig. 4.1  Representation of the network supply, demand and consumption curves after a 
natural disaster event (STREST Deliverable 4.5 (Stojadinovic and Esposito 2016)) 
4.2 Resilience-based stress test for critical non-nuclear 
infrastructures 
In this section the ST@STREST framework proposed in Chapter 2 is analyzed to define a 
new concept of stress test aimed at testing the resilience (and not only the risk) of CIs to 
extreme events and comparing the probability of loss of resilience (not just the probability 
of instantaneous losses) to acceptable levels.  
A resilience-based stress test concept may support decision makers in the evaluation of 
strategies to improve the capacity of CIs to anticipate, absorb and adapt and/or quickly 
recover from a disruptive event.  
In order to define a new concept of stress test aimed at verifying and mitigating the 
resilience of CIs, some aspects of the four-phase ST@STREST workflow have to be 
reviewed and the scope of each phase of the methodology modified, in particular: 
o Pre-Assessment phase (Phase 1) 
The collection of all data available on the CI also has to include all the information 
required for the estimation of the resilience metrics selected for the assessment, 
e.g. the information on the rate of recovery, conditioned on the incurred damage 
state (the recovery curves, a counterpart to vulnerability curves), the funds, 
materials and manpower availability for the recovery and restoration process, the 
pre- and post-event demand patterns for the service of the investigated CI, the 
characterization of the community the CI serves, and the operation models of the 
CI in both normal and emergency conditions.  
Further, resilience-based objectives/acceptance criteria have to be defined for each 
resilience metric and according to the specific perspective considered, i.e. the 
network operator and/or the community the CI serves. Here, the competing 
interests of the network operator (e.g. maximizing profit) and the community (e.g. 
minimizing disruption to the population) need to be reconciled in an aggregate 
acceptance criterion.  
o Assessment phase (Phase 2) 
In the Assessment phase, the resilience (and not only the performance) of each 
component of the CI (Component analysis) and the whole system (System Analysis) 
should be evaluated according to the ST-Level selected. One possible way to 
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perform this task is to use the compositional demand/supply resilience 
quantification framework (Didier et al, in prep). 
More efforts should be devoted to develop standardized methodologies aimed at 
verifying the resilience of CIs in the natural hazard context, both at component and 
system level.  
o Decision Phase (Phase 3) 
The results of the resilience assessment are compared with the objectives defined 
in the pre-assessment phase and resilience mitigation strategies and guidelines are 
formulated. An effort to disaggregate the resilience of a CI-Community system to 
find which elements and systems and which events cause the largest amount of 
impact.  
o Report phase (Phase 4) 
Results of the resilience analysis and mitigation strategies are presented to CI 
authorities, regulators and representatives of the community. An effort to 
communicate resilience (and its probabilistic nature), building on the ongoing work 
on communication or risk, should be undertaken.  
4.2.1 Future research and discussions 
The extension of the proposed framework requires the pursuit of two main goals: 
o Identification of resilience metrics and development of standardized methodologies 
to model the resilience of CIs; and  
o Definition of resilience-based acceptance criteria, understanding how community’s 
needs depend on critical infrastructures. 
Definition and modelling of disaster resilience of engineered systems is the topic of an 
increasing amount of recent research. Nevertheless, there is still a substantial diversity 
among the definitions and the modelling of resilience. In particular, there is no 
standardized approach that suggests how to quantify the natural disaster resilience of CIs 
in the context of natural hazard. As future research, we foresee the need of defining a 
taxonomy of resilience metrics mainly based on the following aspects:  
o The identification of quantifiable time-dependent system delivery functions that 
specify the system functionality of the infrastructure system under study, such as 
the flow, the connectivity, the time delay, etc. 
o The modelling of interdependencies between networks within a community.  
o Including the social perspective in the definition of resilience metrics accounting for 
time-varying community demand for the services provided by the assessed CI. 
The definition of resilience metrics requires a deep understanding of the CI’s functionality 
and the parameters that are important for both the operator and the society the CI serves. 
An example of possible resilience metrics for a gas distribution network (Bellagamba, 
2015) is provided in Fig. 4.2. In this case, the system functionality is expressed in terms 
of daily gas flow. The resilience metrics are identified comparing the required system 
functionality by the community (demand, red line) to the effective capacity of the network 
after an earthquake (blue line), in particular: 
o The non-supplied demand SNonsupplied, defined as the area between the capacity and 
the demand curves when the demand curve is above the capacity curve. 
o The recovery time of the gas distribution network TRecovery, defined as the time 
needed for the gas distribution network to recover its full functionality. 
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o The time needed for the capacity to be equal or greater than the demand, called 
resilience time, TResilience.   
Further, according to the different possible metrics, standardized approaches aimed at 
modelling the resilience of non-nuclear CIs should be identified and/or developed. This 
implies, first a review of the existing approaches in the field of quantitative risk analysis 
and a classification based on, for example, the use of analytic or simulation-based 
approaches for the quantification of the aleatory uncertainties, the inclusion of inter-
dependencies with other infrastructure systems and the interaction with the community 
the CI serves, etc. 
 
Fig. 4.2  Resilience metrics defined for a gas network, from Bellagamba (2015) 
Another important aspect for the development of a resilience-based stress test concept is 
represented by the definition of acceptance resilience-based criteria to be identified in the 
Phase 1 of the workflow. The key question to be answered is:  
o When and how do the CI systems need to be restored before adversely affecting 
the different stakeholders, (e.g. community, the infrastructure operator)?  
Understanding how community’s needs depend on the functionality of the CIs (now and in 
the future) is the key. Business activities need suitable facilities and their supply chains 
and delivery networks; everyone needs a transportation network, electricity, water, gas, 
and communication networks but, in the aftermath of a disastrous event, some of these 
services (e.g. water) are more needed than others.  
A first attempt toward this direction is represented by the report published in April 2015 
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST, 2015): “Community 
Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems”. The Guide provides 
a methodology for a local government, as the logical convener, to bring together the 
relevant stakeholders and incorporate resilience into the long-term community 
development planning processes. In particular, it identifies the ways social organizations 
depend on buildings and infrastructure systems to help support community recovery by 
establishing recovery sequencing and the degree of functionality needed in the built 
environment at different points in time after a hazardous event. The guide also provides 
examples of resilience goals that communities might set for their social institutions. 
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Further examination of extending the stress test concept to societal resilience is presented 
in STREST Deliverable 4.5 (Stojadinovic and Esposito 2016). 
However, developing a CI resilience-targeted stress test is, as of today, beyond the state 
of the art. Foremost, there is a need to develop a harmonized definition of societal 
resilience applicable to a CI-community system. Second, a set of societal resilience targets 
need to be established and transformed into acceptance criteria for the CI systems and 
their elements. Third, a transparent method for modeling and evaluating the CI resilience 
needs to be established. Only then could a stress tests targeting the resilience of a CI 
system be constructed. The ST@STREST methodology and framework that targets CI 
vulnerability, developed in this project, can be used as the prototype for such CI resilience-
targeted stress test. 
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5. Conclusions and recommendations 
In the context of the STREST project, a harmonized approach for stress testing critical 
non-nuclear infrastructures, ST@STREST, has been developed. The aims of the 
ST@STREST methodology and framework are to quantify the safety and the risk of 
individual components as well as of whole CI system with respect to extreme events and 
to compare the expected behavior of the CI to acceptable values.  
In particular, a multi-level stress test methodology has been proposed. Each level is 
characterized by a different scope (component or system) and by a different level of risk 
analysis complexity (starting from design codes and ending with state-of-the-art 
probabilistic risk analyses, such as cascade modelling). This allows flexibility and 
application to a broad range of infrastructures The framework is composed of four main 
phases and nine steps. The goals, the method, the time frame, and the total costs of the 
stress test are defined in the Pre-Assessment Phase. In the Assessment Phase, the stress 
test is performed at component level and system level. The outcomes of the stress test 
are checked and analyzed in the Decision Phase. Finally, the results are reported and 
communicated to stakeholders and authorities (Report Phase). The ST@STREST data 
framework, used to store and manage the data about the CI under test, is also flexible, in 
that it allows the use of data structures that support frequentist (event and fault trees, 
bow ties) and belief-based notions of probability.  
Further, in order to allow transparency of the stress test process, the data, models, 
methods adopted for the risk assessment and the associated uncertainty are clearly 
documented and managed by different experts involved in the stress test process. This 
allows to define how reliable the results of the stress test are. In particular, a penalty 
system has been proposed to acknowledge the limitation of the methods and models used 
to assess the performance of the CI and eventually penalize the output of the risk 
assessment. In particular, the proposed system penalizes the results of the hazard and 
risk assessment of the conducted stress test by evaluating an extra uncertainty, here 
named penalty uncertainty, to amplify the uncertainties introduced by simplistic 
approaches that cannot guarantee a sufficiently accurate analysis. 
The outcome of the stress test is defined using a grading system based on the comparison 
of the results of risk assessment with the risk objectives (i.e. acceptance criteria) defined 
at the beginning of the test. The proposed system is composed of three different 
outcomes: Pass, Partly Pass, and Fail. The CI passes the stress test if it attains grade AA 
or A. The former grade corresponds to negligible risk whereas the latter grade corresponds 
to risk being as low as reasonably practicable. The CI partly passes the stress test if it 
receives grade B, which corresponds to the existence of possibly unjustifiable risk. Finally, 
the CI fails the stress test if it is given grade C, which corresponds to the existence of 
intolerable risk. Guidelines for the grading of individual components are also proposed 
together with a generalization of the grading system to take into account epistemic 
uncertainties and system analysis. 
The stress test approach proposed in this project addresses the vulnerabilities of CIs to 
catastrophic by rare (high-consequence low-probability) natural hazard events. An 
extension of the proposed ST@STREST methodology and framework to integrate the 
results of stress tests and the data retrieved after disastrous events with the data collected 
during every-day operation of the system and its degradation (low-consequence persistent 
events) into a unified life-cycle management strategy for CIs has been proposed. In 
particular, the results of the risk analysis conducted in the scope of a stress test in terms 
of system performance and expected costs of natural events, may be incorporated in a 
life-cycle cost analysis of the CI system and optimization of its operations and 
maintenance. Further, the evaluation of risk reduction strategies resulting from a loss 
disaggregation may make it possible to improve the full management and maintenance 
plan of the CI itself. Moreover, the evaluation of the state of civil infrastructures after the 
occurrence of a natural event, and the collection and processing of post-event data, such 
as typology, location, component’s features and the assessed physical damages, can be 
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useful to update the state condition history of the inspected components of the CI and to 
estimate and/or update performance prediction models used in a future risk analysis. 
An extension of the ST@STREST methodology and framework to evaluate not only the 
vulnerability but also the resilience of CIs, i.e. “the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, 
recover from and more successfully adapt to adverse events” (The National Academy 
2012) has also been proposed. This extension builds on the ST@STREST methodology by 
modelling the post-disaster recovery process of a CI system and by quantifying the lack 
of resilience and the attributes of a resilient system using a novel compositional 
supply/demand CI resilience quantification framework. This extension enables a new role 
of a stress test, that of examining the ability of a community and its CIs to bounce back 
after a natural disaster.  
However, there are some points of the proposed ST@STREST methodology and framework 
that need to be discussed and further developed as a part of the future studies.  
The stress test has been classified in three (macro) conceptual frameworks for the safety 
of non-nuclear CIs. The selection of the appropriate ST-L and sub-levels, made by the PM 
during the Pre-Assessment phase, depends on regulatory requirements that should 
account for the importance/criticality of the type CI. CIs are complex and diverse in nature. 
It is important to rank them, if the number of CIs being considered is greater than one for 
performing the stress test. The ranking of CIs is a challenging task due to their diverse 
nature, the potential consequence of failure, the types of hazards posing threat to them, 
vulnerability state etc. A criticality assessment of the CIs, aimed at identifying and ranking 
CIs (for example at a national scale), may represent a practical tool to support the choice 
of the appropriate ST-level.  
The proposed penalty system requires “level of detail and sophistication” to be properly 
set by experts’ consensus. Experts must have a clear idea about models and methods 
available in the scientific literature and their applicability to perform each step of the risk 
analysis. This may not be feasible for all perils that have to be considered for the stress 
test. Secondly, the computation of the penalty uncertainty does not take into account the 
complexity of the approach adopted for the multi-risk analysis. This is because the current 
level of knowledge does not allow ranking these approaches, even though different multi-
risk methods have been proposed recently. 
To establish a common grading system, the risk objectives of the risk measures across a 
range of interests should be harmonized on the European level. This is a task for regulatory 
bodies and for industry association: they should reconcile the societal and industry interest 
and develop mutually acceptable risk limits. Further, it is yet to be determined how grades 
of single components should affect the global outcome of stress test. Moreover, in case 
epistemic uncertainty analysis is of concern, it is currently recommended that the mean 
value of the designated risk measure is used. However, other options such as a grade 
based on other quantiles of the risk measure distribution should be investigated. 
Finally, developing a CI resilience-targeted stress test is, as of today, beyond the state of 
the art. The ST@STREST methodology and framework that targets CI vulnerability, 
developed in this project, can be used as the prototype for such CI resilience-targeted 
stress test once CI and societal resilience is defined in a harmonized way, acceptable levels 
of resilience agreed on, and ways to transparently and consistently evaluate CI resilience 
developed and accepted in practice.  
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